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INTRODUCTION 
 
It is not uncommon for a court to find itself at the crossroads of 
two conflicting, yet equally controlling laws.1 In instances such as this, 
how does a court determine which set of laws should dictate the 
outcome of the case? The intersection of the patent and antitrust laws, 
while not a new conflict, has recently attracted a significant amount of 
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate and Certificate in Intellectual Property candidate, May 2006, 
Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology; B.S.E. Biomedical 
Engineering, cum laude, June 2004, University of Michigan. Erin Conway is an 
Executive Articles Editor for the Chicago-Kent Law Review. 
1 Even just within the realm of intellectual property, there are a plethora of 
conflicts. For example, in Oliveira v. Frito-Lay, Inc., the Second Circuit grappled 
with whether Astrud Giberto could enjoin Frito-Lay under the trademark laws from 
using her signature song, “The Girl From Ipanema,” in one of its commercials. 251 
F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2001). The court held that because songs are traditionally protected 
under the copyright laws, this created a conflict with her present action. While 
neither set of laws discussed what to do in such a situation, the court looked to the 
underlying purpose of each Act. The court noted that copyrights can only be granted 
for a limited amount of time, and once that time expires, the work goes into the 
public domain. Because trademarks offer perpetual rights, it would go directly 
against this principle of the Copyright Act to give Giberto trademark protection. 
1
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2 
attention.2 This conflict arose from the traditional view that intellectual 
property rights regimes, which seek to stimulate innovation by 
granting limited monopolies, and the antitrust laws, which seek to 
protect competition by eliminating monopolies, were inherently 
contradictory.3 Today, however, most commentators view the antitrust 
and intellectual property laws as complementary, both seeking to 
protect consumers, yet, admittedly by taking different paths.4 
Unfortunately unifying patent policy with antitrust principles in order 
to effectuate this mantra has been difficult, in major part, because 
neither the Patent Act, nor the Sherman Act sets distinct boundaries or 
defines in any meaningful way how these two bodies of law are to be 
reconciled.5 What’s more, when faced with alleged antitrust violations 
by holders of intellectual property rights, the approaches taken by the 
various Federal Circuit courts run the gamut.6 
In a case of first impression in the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit, Schor v. Abbot Laboratories7 revealed this 
inherent tension between the antitrust and patent laws. There, the court 
was charged with determining what, if any, liability a patent holder is 
subject to under the antitrust laws. Specifically, the court asked 
whether a patent holder may be liable for using its patent to exclude 
others from, or to affect competition in, more than one relevant 
market. In the end, the approach taken by the Seventh Circuit harms 
the ultimate beneficiary of both sets of laws—the consumer—by 
severely curtailing the antitrust laws at the hands of the patent laws. 
Part I of this Comment outlines the basic principles underlying 
both the patent and the antitrust laws and describes the inherent 
tension between them. Part II discusses relevant cases in the antitrust-
                                                 
2 See, e.g., David A. Balto & Andrew M. Wolman, Intellectual Property and 
Antitrust: General Principles, 43 IDEA 395, 396 (2003). 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 The notable exceptions are §§ 271(c) and (d) of the Patent Act. 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(c), (d) (2002). 
6 See discussion in Part II, infra. 
7 Schor v. Abbott Labs (“Abbott II”), 457 F. 3d 608 (7th Cir. 2006). 
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intellectual property conflict, including a recent Supreme Court case, 
Eastman Kodak, Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.8 and 
interpretations of the Court’s holding by the First, Ninth and Federal 
Circuits. These cases will shed light on the path that the Seventh 
Circuit should have taken. Part III delves into the facts of Schor v. 
Abbott Labs, a case that specifically dealt with the scope of intellectual 
property rights in light of an alleged antitrust violation. Lastly, Part IV 
contends that by following the lead of the Federal Circuit in rejecting 
the Ninth Circuit’s approach, the Seventh Circuit severely undercut 
competition by elevating the patent laws over the antitrust laws. Part 
IV further contends that the Seventh Circuit should have followed the 
approach of the Ninth Circuit, which properly addresses the policy 
concerns underlying each set of laws by raising a rebuttable 
presumption that a patent holder has a valid business justification in 
exercising its statutory-granted proprietary rights. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAWS  
AND THE TENSION THAT EXISTS BETWEEN THEM 
 
A. Underlying Principles of the Antitrust Laws 
 
In their simplest form, antitrust laws are intended to ensure that 
markets remain competitive. This is desirable in that freely operating 
competitive markets result in the most efficient allocation of a nation’s 
resources and bring consumers the widest variety of choices, the 
highest quality goods and services, and the lowest possible prices.9  
While the traditional rationale underlying antitrust laws had both 
social and economic justifications, more recently, the promotion of 
consumer welfare has become the sole guiding principle.10  
To effectuate this goal of protecting consumer welfare, the 
antitrust laws proscribe certain types of anticompetitive conduct. Not 
                                                 
8 504 U.S. 451 (1992). 
9 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF 
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 3 (1994). 
10 Balto & Wolman, supra note 2, at 398. 
3
Conway: The Monopoly Game: Has the Seventh Circuit Given Patent Holders a
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2006
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 2, Issue 1                           Fall 2006 
 
4 
all conduct that hurts competitors is anticompetitive or a violation of 
the antitrust laws.11 Thus, the main focus of the antitrust inquiry is to 
determine whether the conduct under scrutiny is likely to harm 
consumers, for example by raising prices or restricting production of 
goods or services.12 Two of the main statutory provisions defining 
conduct that is unlawful under the antitrust laws are §§ 1 and 2 of the 
Sherman Antitrust Act.13 Generally, § 1 of the Sherman Act proscribes 
agreements among competitors that interfere with the ability of firms 
to enter markets, introduce new products or price their products.14 On 
the other hand, § 2, which will be the main focus of this Comment, has 
the prohibition of monopolization as its prime concern.15  
In United States v. Grinnell Corp.,16 the Supreme Court of the 
United States defined monopolization under § 2 of the Sherman Act as 
having two main elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in 
the relevant market, and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of 
that power as distinguished from growth or development as a 
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic 
                                                 
11 Schor v. Abbott Labs (“Abbott I”), 378 F. Supp. 2d 850, 856 (N.D. Ill. 2005) 
(citing Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993)). 
12 Balto & Wolman, supra note 2, at 403. 
13 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (2000). This Comment will mainly focus on the Sherman 
Act, in particular § 2, but § 7 of the Clayton Act (proscribing stock and asset 
acquisitions), § 3 of the Clayton Act (prohibiting certain forms of tying and 
exclusive dealing) and § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (prohibiting unfair 
methods of competition) also come into play in the intellectual property context. 
14 Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides: “Every contract, combination in the 
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among 
the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.” 
15 Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides: “Every person who shall 
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person 
or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several 
States, or with foreign nations shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction 
thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if 
any other person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by 
both said punishment, in the discretion of the court.” 
16 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966). 
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accident.17 The language of §2 makes it clear that a monopoly itself is 
not illegal. Rather, the offense of monopolization contemplates some 
sort of anticompetitive or exclusionary conduct. Thus, the limitations 
of §2 take into account that it cannot merely forbid all monopolies, 
such as those that result from natural economic conditions, vigorous 
competition on the merits, or technological innovation, but only those 
that were acquired or maintained by means other than normal 
competition.18 
The first element of a § 2 monopolization claim requires a court to 
define the relevant antitrust market.19 Without a definition of the 
relevant market, “there is no way to measure a defendant's ability to 
lessen or destroy competition.”20 Yet, because defining the relevant 
market requires “a factual inquiry into the ‘commercial realities’ faced 
by consumers” it is not an easy undertaking.21 In defining the relevant 
market, the courts have examined whether consumers using one 
product will easily shift to another product, should, for example, the 
price of the product they are using increase or the price of other 
comparable products decrease. 
Once the court has established the parameters within which the 
alleged monopolist’s power can be evaluated, it must determine what 
                                                 
17 15 U.S.C. § 2; Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 570-71. A claim of attempted monopoly 
under § 2 requires: (a) the intent to monopolize a relevant market, (b) predatory 
conduct in pursuit of that end, (c) a dangerous probability of success, and (d) causal 
“antitrust” injury. Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 698 F.2d 1377, 1382 
(9th Cir. 1983). 
18 HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, at 10-2, 10-3. 
19 Essentially, this means that the court must determine what subset of all of the 
goods or services the defendant is in competition with and in what geographic area. 
A relevant market can be as small as a single brand of a product or service. Eastman 
Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc. (“Kodak I”), 504 U.S. 451, 481-82 
(1992). 
20 Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied 
445 U.S. 917 (1980) (stating a definition of relevant market is essential to assessing 
the alleged offender’s power over competition). 
21 Kodak I, 504 U.S. at 482 (quoting Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 572). 
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share of that market is controlled by the alleged offender.22 In 
calculating a firm’s market share, in order to determine whether it has 
monopoly power, the court must determine what percentage of the 
total output in the market is sold by the defendant.23 One indicia of 
monopoly power includes a firm’s “power to control prices or exclude 
competition.”24 Notably, the Supreme Court held in Illinois Tool 
Works, Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc. that a patent does not necessarily 
confer monopoly power in the relevant market.25 
The acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power in itself is not 
necessarily an actionable offense under the Sherman Act.26 Therefore, 
                                                 
22 Because of the importance of the definition of relevant markets to the 
outcome of a monopolization or attempt to monopolize case, the plaintiff in such 
cases will inevitably attempt to establish the narrowest market definitions possible, 
while the defendant will attempt to establish the broadest possible market definitions. 
See, e.g., Int’l Boxing Club of N.Y., Inc. v. United States, 358 U.S. 242 (1959) 
(defendants argued that the relevant market was all professional boxing events, while 
the plaintiff successfully argued that the relevant market should be limited to 
championship boxing matches). 
23 HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, at 10-16. 
24 Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 571. As further explanation: 
A pure monopoly exists when the defendant is the only seller in 
the market, and it is impossible for anyone to enter the market in 
competition with it. But a defendant may be guilty of 
monopolization even if it does not have a 100 percent market 
share, so long as it has sufficient control over the market that it can 
increase price and reduce output without being constrained by 
competition. 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, at 10-6. “Courts generally require a 65% market share to 
establish a prima facie case of market power under § 1 of the Act.” Image Technical 
Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. (“Kodak II”), 125 F.3d 1195, 1206 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(citing American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 797 (1946)). Thus, 
something more is required to establish monopoly power.  
25 126 S.Ct. 1281, 1293 (2006). 
26 For example, the Supreme Court in Grinnell noted that power gained “from 
growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or 
historic accident” is not the type of conduct the Sherman Act aims to prohibit. 384 
U.S. at 570-71. Thus, as one can see, this is why exercising one’s rights under the 
government sanctioned, legal monopoly of the patent grant alone does not violate the 
Act. 
6
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7 
the requirements of a § 2 monopolization claim are designed to “strike 
a balance by prohibiting only monopolies acquired or maintained by 
anticompetitive means.”27 The second element of a §2 claim relates 
requires some showing of anticompetitive conduct, which can include 
the use of monopoly power “to foreclose competition, to gain a 
competitive advantage, or to destroy a competitor.”28 Generally, if a 
firm’s conduct is part of a willful scheme to acquire or maintain 
monopoly power by means other than competition on the merits, it has 
violated § 2.29  To assess whether the conduct of an intellectual 
property holder is anticompetitive, it is typically necessary to perform 
a rigorous economic analysis of the likely competitive effects of that 
conduct. 
One of the most controversial theories of anticompetitive conduct 
involves claims that a monopolist in one market is attempting to 
“leverage” its monopoly into another market. To establish a § 2 
Sherman Act violation based on monopoly leveraging, a plaintiff must 
prove that the monopolist: “(1) possesses monopoly power in the 
primary market; (2) gained or attempted to gain a monopoly power in 
a second relevant market; and (3) willfully acquired the monopoly 
power by some exclusionary conduct and not through efficiency and 
innovation.”30 Most often, monopoly leveraging cases involve tying31 
claims, or some other exclusionary conduct.32 At issue in Abbott was 
                                                 
27 1 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, MARK D. JANIS & MARK A. LEMLEY, IP AND 
ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW 10-3 (2002). 
28 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc. (“Kodak I”), 504 U.S. 
451, 482-83 (1992) (quoting United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948)). 
29 Kodak I, 504 U.S. at 483. 
30 Schor v. Abbott Labs. (“Abbott I”), 378 F. Supp. 2d 850, 856 (N.D. Ill. 
2005) (citing Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 547 (9th 
Cir. 1991)). 
31 “A tying arrangement is ‘an arrangement by a party to sell one product but 
only on the condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product, or at 
least agrees that he will not purchase that product from any other supplier.’” Kodak I, 
504 U.S. at 461 (quoting N. Pac. R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958)). 
32 Tying can also be an exclusionary practice in itself and can lead to § 2 
liability. 
7
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whether a theory of monopoly leveraging that did not involve one of 
the typical exclusionary practices—such as tying—could violate the 
antitrust laws.33 
Unfortunately, the application of most theories of antitrust liability 
is particularly difficult when the alleged monopolist also has a legal 
monopoly in one or more of the relevant markets through some 
statutory-granted intellectual property right. For example, the thought 
of punishing a patent holder—who has a statutory right to exclude 
others from using its patented product—for refusing to license a patent 
or refusing to deal with its competitors seems counterintuitive. If one 
purpose of the antitrust laws is to encourage competition and 
innovation, then it seems as though a firm that has achieved monopoly 
status because of the demand for its patented good and has merely 
attempted to reap the benefits of such success, should not be punished 
for doing so. As Judge Learned Hand once declared, “[t]he successful 
competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be turned upon 
when he wins.”34 Yet the Supreme Court has made it clear that a 
patentee’s right to exclude is not absolute.35  In light of this principle, 
the courts have been hard pressed to specify under what set of 
circumstances and for what reasons a patent holder will violate the 
antitrust laws.  
 
B. Underlying Principles of the Patent Laws 
 
Patents, along with copyrights, trademarks and trade secrets are a 
form of legal protection for intellectual property. In very simplistic 
terms, a patent is a time-limited property right granted by the United 
States federal government.36 The subject matter of a patent may 
                                                 
33 Schor v. Abbott Labs (“Abbott II”), 457 F.3d 608, 610 (7th Cir. 2006). 
34 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 
1945). 
35 See Kodak I, 504 U.S. at 483 n.32 (citing Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen 
Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 602-05 (1985)). 
36 The United States Constitution gives Congress the power “[t]o promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
8
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9 
include any “process, machine, manufacture, or composition of 
matter.”37 However, only such inventions that are novel,38 useful,39 and 
nonobvious40 are worthy of a patent. The patent grant allows its holder 
to prevent others from making, using, selling, or offering to sell his or 
her patented invention, or importing it into the United States41 during 
the term of the patent—twenty years from the date the patent 
application was filed.42 Thus, in the sense that a patent allows its 
holder to prevent others from competing in the market for the patented 
good, a patent is essentially a government sanctioned monopoly.43 
                                                                                                                   
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
37 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
38 Id. §§ 101-102. 
39 Id. § 101. 
40 Id. § 103. An invention is obvious if it constitutes merely a trivial 
advancement over the state of the art. 
41 Id. § 154(a)(1) & (2) (2000); see also id. § 271(a) (“Except as otherwise 
provided in this title, whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells 
any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States 
any patented invention during the term of the patent therefore, infringes the patent.”). 
The term of the patent begins on the date that the patent issues and ends 20 years 
from the date that the patent application was filed in the United States. Id. § 
154(a)(2). Notably, a patent does not convey any positive or affirmative right to 
make, use, sell, offer to sell, or import an invention; a patent is a negative property 
right. 
42 Id. § 154(a)(2). While the patent term technically lasts for twenty years, the 
enforceable life of a patent does not begin until the date the patent is issued. JANICE 
M. MULLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PATENT LAW 17 (2003). Thus, the time elapsed 
between filing and issuance of the patent—the pendency period—is subtracted from 
the enforceable life of the patent. Id. In the U.S., the pendency period usually lasts 
about 2 years, so in reality, the enforceable patent term is more like eighteen years. 
Id. 
43 MULLER, supra note 42, at 18 (citing Jamesbury Corp. v. Litton Indus. Prod., 
Inc., 756 F.2d 1556, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). Others argue that patents are more akin 
to “time-limited government conveyances of potential monopoly power, which can 
be put to ‘good’ or ‘bad’ uses from a societal standpoint.” MULLER, supra note 42, at 
18 (citing Giles S. Rich, Are Letters Patent Grants of Monopoly?, 15 W. NEW 
ENGLAND L. REV. 239, 251 (1993)). 
9
Conway: The Monopoly Game: Has the Seventh Circuit Given Patent Holders a
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2006
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 2, Issue 1                           Fall 2006 
 
10 
In exchange for this right to exclude, the inventor must fully 
disclose the invention to the public in sufficient detail and clarity.44 As 
compared to the utility, novelty and nonobviousness requirements 
which draw out the “technical merits of the claimed invention,” the 
disclosure requirements of the Patent Act pertain to the “informative 
quality of the patent application.”45 Thus, the Act requires that this 
disclosure be “enabling,” such that when read, others will be able to 
make and use the invention (once the patent expires), without undue 
experimentation.46 This puts the public in a position to almost 
immediately begin competing with the patent holder once the term of 
protection expires. In addition, the inventor must disclose the “best 
mode,” known to him or her, of practicing the invention.47 This 
requirement seeks to prevent the inventor from disclosing an inferior 
means of carrying out the invention, while concealing preferred 
embodiments from the public.48 
Yet, without the protections afforded by the patent laws, inventors 
would have little incentive to invest in research and development, let 
alone to publicize their resulting inventions for fear that someone may 
pirate their work.49 The key problem with investing in the research and 
                                                 
44 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1. The Patent Act mandates that: 
The specification shall contain a written description of the 
invention and of the manner and process of making and using it, in 
such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person 
skilled in the art to which it pertains, or which it is most nearly 
connected to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best 
mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention. 
45 MULLER, supra note 42, at 65. 
46 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1. 
47 Id. 
48 See MULLER, supra note 42, at 76. 
49 Another option, aside from the patent laws, is for the inventor to keep his 
invention as a trade secret. Unlike patents, trade secrets have no time limits. 
However, with trade secrets, the inventor can only protect from free-riding what he 
can keep secret. For example, the Coca-Cola Company holds the recipe for Coke as a 
trade secret by maintaining strict confidentiality and non-compete policies within the 
company. Yet, for technologies that can be easily reverse engineered (the process of 
discovering the technological principles of a device or system usually with the 
10
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development of new technologies is that “the cost of creation [] can be 
very high, but the cost of copying it is often trivial.”50 In theory, 
because copying is so easy and inexpensive, without the protections 
offered by the patent grant, free-riders and copyists would make it 
difficult if not impossible for inventors to recoup their initial 
investments.51 As some scholars argue, without patent protection, 
invention and technical innovation would be uneconomical and would 
come to a halt.52 The patent grant allows inventors to recoup their sunk 
research and development costs by charging monopoly prices.53 To 
would-be inventors, the lure of obtaining a government-sanctioned 
monopoly on a commercially profitable invention induces research, 
development, and, ultimately, progress in the form of new 
technology.54 By providing time-limited right to exclude others, the 
patent laws make inventing an attractive endeavor. 
                                                                                                                   
intention to construct a new device or program that does the same thing), trade secret 
is not a desirable form of protection. In the United States and many other countries, 
even if an artifact or process is protected by trade secrets, reverse-engineering the 
artifact or process is often lawful as long as it is obtained legitimately. The patent 
laws, on the other hand, allow the patent holder to bring his invention to the public 
without the fear that a copyist may simply reproduce the patented technology 
through reverse engineering. See MULLER, supra note 42, at 67. 
50 Id. at 6. 
51 Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property 
Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 994 (April 1997) (“In a private market economy, 
individuals will not invest in invention or creation unless the expected return from 
doing so exceeds the cost of doing so—that is, unless they can reasonably expect to 
make a profit from the endeavor”). “The ability of free-riders to appropriate the 
benefits of a new technology serves as a deterrent to those considering an investment 
in developing or investing in such technologies.” Id. 
52 Id.; see also MULLER, supra note 42, at 7 (“When adequate incentives for 
innovation do not exist, the result is underproduction of new inventions. . . . Absent a 
mechanism to exclude ‘free riders,’ i.e., people who enjoy the benefit of the good 
without paying for it, [new inventions] will be underproduced.”). 
53 Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects of Unenforced Invalid 
Patents, 91 MINN. L. REV. 101, 151-52 (The benefits [of a patent] include potential 
monopoly profits for the life of the patent.”). 
54 See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974). 
11
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While it is clear that the immediate effect of the patent laws is to 
secure a fair return for the inventor’s labor, the ultimate aim is, by this 
incentive, to benefit the public.55 The patent laws promote consumer 
welfare in the long term by encouraging investment in the creation and 
development of new technology. By fostering faster introduction of 
inventions through its incentives, the patent laws also increase 
competition.56 Additionally, as noted above, the patent laws essentially 
strike a bargain with the inventor—protection, in the form of a 
government-sanctioned right to exclude in the market of the invention, 
in exchange for public disclosure of the invention. So, not only does 
the public reap the benefits of technological progress, but also they 
benefit from the knowledge that the patentee gained in developing 
such technology. Thus, like the antitrust laws, the laws relating to 
intellectual property are aimed, in significant part, at fostering 
economic development.57 
 
                                                 
55 Thus, the patent laws are not aimed at benefiting the inventor. The patent 
laws merely use the lure of obtaining monopoly profits on a patented invention to 
entice inventors to invest in developing new technologies, and thus, benefit the 
public. This is also true for the Copyright Laws. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural 
Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (“The primary objective of a copyright is 
not to reward the labor of authors, but ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts.’”) (brackets in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I. § 8, cl. 8). 
56 Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. (“Kodak II”), 125 F.3d 
1195, 1215 (9th Cir. 1997). 
57 Economists have offered three other principle rationales for the existence of 
intellectual property rights: (1) Broader dissemination of innovations: The patent 
grant is essentially a bargain with the Patent Office. The patent holder receives the 
right to exclude others in the market of the invention in exchange for public 
disclosure; (2) Greater commercialization of inventions: intellectual property rights 
encourage licensing; and (3) Minimizing duplicative research. Balto & Wolman, 
supra note 2, at 405-07.  
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C. The Tension 
 
Intellectual property rights enjoy greater importance today than 
ever before and play a large role in fostering technological growth.58 
Yet, on the other hand, the antitrust laws are hailed as “represent[ing] a 
fundamental national economic policy.”59 Thus, it is of no surprise that 
courts are increasingly faced with questions of the proper breadth and 
enforceability of the patent grant in light of the antitrust laws. 
Confounding these questions is the fact that the patent and antitrust 
laws were traditionally viewed as directly contradictory—one granting 
monopolies and the other prohibiting them.60 Yet today, most feel that 
the supposed tension is merely illusory. In theory, the underlying 
purposes of the two bodies of law are largely the same: to promote the 
public good and to benefit consumer welfare. 61 However, in practice, 
there is still considerable tension between the two bodies of law and 
many of the relevant cases addressing the intersection of intellectual 
                                                 
58 See Robert P. Taylor, The Continuing Presence of Antitrust Considerations 
in Patent Enforcement, 877 PLI PAT 119, 125-26 (2006). In 2005, the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office (“the PTO”) granted 143,806 utility patents. Since 
1963, the PTO has granted a grand total of 3,891,901 utility patents. Thus, over 37 
percent of the total number of patents granted occurred in 2005 alone! USPTO 
ELECTRONIC INFORMATION PRODUCTS DIVISION, ALL TECHNOLOGIES REPORT 
JANUARY 1, 1963 – DECEMBER 31, 2005, 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/all_tech.pdf; see also Mazer v. 
Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). 
59 Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, 476 U.S. 409, 421 (1986). 
60 While most of the cases impacting the antitrust laws have arisen in the 
context of the patent laws, the other areas of intellectual property rights—copyright, 
trademark and trade secrets—are equally in tension with the antitrust laws. This 
comment will focus exclusively on the intersection between the patent and the 
antitrust laws. 
61 Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. 
Cir. 1990) (both laws herald themselves as “encouraging innovation, industry, and 
competition”) (citing Locite Corp. v. Unltraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 876-77 (Fed. 
Cir. 1985)). 
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property and antitrust have not effectuated this supposed goal.62 Schor 
v. Abbott Labs is such a case. 
Despite their common goal, defining a boundary between the 
objectives of antitrust and those of intellectual property protection has 
been notoriously difficult, if not impossible.63 In major part, this is 
because both statutory provisions are silent on the issue and there is 
little to no Supreme Court jurisprudence resolving the conflict. 
Furthermore, while these bodies of law both strive to promote 
competition, they take very different paths to effectuate this goal.  
In order for both the patent and antitrust laws to achieve their 
mutual goal of encouraging innovation while keeping anticompetitive 
behavior in product markets to a minimum, the two laws must be held 
in equilibrium. When one set of laws is elevated over the other, 
competition is stifled and the public is harmed. Yet, applying antitrust 
and patent principles in a non-discriminatory manner is particularly 
difficult because of the issues discussed above. This is especially true 
in a day when inventors make significant investments to protect their 
intellectual property and want to be able to take full advantage of that 
investment. 
While many of the principles underlying the patent laws have 
seemingly dictated the struggle to reconcile thus far, some concessions 
have been made for antitrust considerations. For example, as a general 
rule, a patent holder is not required to license the protected technology 
and has no duty to cooperate with competitors.64 However, this right is 
not unqualified; “it exists only if there are legitimate competitive 
                                                 
62 Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. (“Kodak II”), 125 F.3d 
1195, 1217 (9th Cir. 1997) (“At the border of intellectual property monopolies and 
antitrust markets lies a field of dissonance yet to be harmonized by statute or the 
Supreme Court.”). 
63 “[T]here is no easy delineation between a patent holder’s permissible 
exercise of its rights under patent law, which grants a government sanctioned 
monopoly and expressly allows the patentee to engage in exclusionary conduct, and 
anticompetitive behavior that violates antitrust law, which proscribes exclusionary 
conduct when coupled with monopoly power.” Schor v. Abbott Labs (“Abbott I”), 
378 F. Supp. 2d 850, 855-56 (N.D. Ill. 2005). 
64 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 602-
05 (1985). 
14
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 2
http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol2/iss1/2
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 2, Issue 1                           Fall 2006 
 
15 
reasons for the refusal.”65 Section 2 of the Sherman Act may prohibit a 
firm from unilaterally refusing to license their intellectual property 
rights or deal with competitors where such a refusal would allow the 
firm to obtain or maintain monopoly power by excluding competition 
in a way that does not benefit consumers. Furthermore, a patent holder 
may violate the Sherman Act by exercising its right to exclude beyond 
the scope of the patent grant in an attempt to curtail competition in a 
secondary market.66 
The antitrust theory of monopoly leveraging, while not new, has 
not been adequately clarified by the courts with respect to the actions 
of a patent, or other intellectual property right holder. Some circuit 
courts have, on varying levels, attempted to further develop monopoly 
leveraging as an antitrust cause of action against intellectual property 
holders. While monopoly leveraging in the context of intellectual 
property has not been directly addressed by the Supreme Court, at 
least four circuit courts67 have interpreted the Court’s holding in 
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical, Inc. (“Kodak I”) as having 
varying ramifications on the outcome of this issue. All of these 
decisions offer insight into the path that the Seventh Circuit should 
have taken in deciding Abbott II and are discussed below. 
                                                 
65 Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. (“Kodak I”), 504 U.S. 
451, 483 n.32 (1992); see also Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 600-01 (“The absence of a 
duty to transact business with another firm is, in some respects, merely the 
counterpart of the independent businessman's cherished right to select his customers 
and his associates. The high value that we have placed on the right to refuse to deal 
with other firms does not mean that the right is unqualified.”).  
66 As the Supreme Court in Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States noted: 
[The patentee] may grant licenses to make, use or vend, restricted 
in point of space or time, or with any other restriction upon the 
exercise of the granted privilege, save only that by attaching a 
condition to his license he may not enlarge his monopoly and thus 
acquire some other which the statute and the patent together did 
not give. 
309 U.S. 436, 456 (1940). 
67 The First, Ninth, Federal and Seventh Circuits have all cited to Kodak I in 
deciding similar issues. The courts come down on different sides as to whether the 
Supreme Court’s holding actually dictates whether a patent holder may be liable 
under a theory of monopoly leveraging. 
15
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II. SEMINAL CASES IN THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND  
ANTITRUST CONFLICT  
 
A. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. 
 
In 1979, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
touched on the theory of monopoly leveraging in Berkey Photo, Inc. v. 
Eastman Kodak Co.68 At issue in Berkey Photo was Kodak’s conduct 
in the photography and photofinishing industry, in which it competes 
along with several other firms, including Berkey Photo.69 The 
relationship between the two firms was complex in that Kodak was 
Berkey Photo’s competitor in some markets and it supplier in others, 
such as those for film and photofinishing equipment and supplies.70 
Berkey Photo claimed that Kodak had violated § 2 of the Sherman Act 
by willfully acquiring and maintaining monopolies in the film, color 
print paper, and camera markets and that this conduct “caused it to 
lose sales in the camera and photofinishing markets and to pay 
excessive prices to Kodak for film, color print paper, and 
photofinishing equipment.”71 
The Second Circuit took care to define what conduct, exercised in 
conjunction with monopoly power, would bring about a § 2 violation. 
The court reiterated that the Sherman Act does not condemn one “who 
merely by superior skill and intelligence . . . [acquired monopoly 
power] because nobody could do it as well,” but rather one who wields 
that monopoly to prevent or impede competition.72 Thus, Kodak could 
not be held liable for merely acquiring monopoly power because it had 
a superior product, but only if it exercised that power in an 
anticompetitive manner. Conversely, the court held that in light of an 
improper acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power, a firm could 
                                                 
68 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979). 
69 Id. at 267. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 267-68. 
72 Id. at 274 (“[A] firm with a legitimately achieved monopoly may not wield 
the resulting power to tighten its hold on the market.”). 
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not escape liability by arguing that it had not used that power to extract 
improper benefits.73 As the court explained, both innocent and 
intentional acquisition and maintenance of a monopoly “coupled with 
the purpose or intent to exercise that power” in a manner that excludes 
or prevents competition violates § 2.74  
Attempting to show that Kodak’s conduct was exclusionary in 
nature as required by § 2, Berkey Photo moved forward, essentially, 
under a theory of monopoly leveraging. Berkey Photo contended that 
Kodak had “illicitly gained an advantage in [the markets for 
photofinishing equipment and services] by leveraging its power over 
film and cameras.”75 Agreeing with Berkey Photo, the court explicitly 
recognized that “a firm may not employ its market position as a lever 
to create or attempt to create a monopoly in another market.”76  
The Second Circuit found its conclusion to be “an inexorable 
interpretation of the antitrust laws.”77 Even when legitimately 
obtained, monopolies are contrary to our notions of fair competition 
and must be strictly constrained. Such monopoly power is only 
tolerated out of considerations of fairness towards the innocent 
monopolist and insofar as necessary to preserve proper economic 
incentives.78 Accordingly, the court found no reason to allow for the 
exercise of monopoly power to the detriment of competition, even if 
such power was wielded over a secondary market.79 Such behavior 
                                                 
73 Id. (“Unlawfully acquired power remains anathema even when kept 
dormant.”).  
74 Id. Thus, it is no defense for a firm who wields their monopoly power in an 
anticompetitive manner to argue that they innocently acquired such power—such as 
through a patent, or as the result of a superior product. Likewise, it is no defense for 
an intentional monopolist to argue that it did not exercise that power in a destructive 
manner. Id. at 274-75. 
75 Id. at 275. 
76 Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 275 (emphasis added) (citing Griffith, 334 U.S. at 
107). 
77 Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 275. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. (“There is no reason to allow the exercise of such power to the detriment 
of competition, in either the controlled market or any other.”). 
17
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does not become “more palatable” simply by arguing that 
“competition in the leveraged market may not be destroyed but merely 
distorted.”80 The court found support for this theory of monopoly 
leveraging in United States v. Griffith in which the Supreme Court held 
that the defendant had illegally used its monopoly power “to beget 
monopoly.”81 
Yet, according to the court, Griffith stood for more than just the 
recognition of monopoly leveraging as an antitrust cause of action. 
Griffith’s “rationale swept more broadly . . . for it admonished that ‘the 
use of monopoly power, however lawfully acquired, to foreclose 
competition, to gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy a 
competitor, [was] unlawful.’”82 The court recognized the theory of 
monopoly leveraging as linked to the prohibition against tying 
arrangements.83 To find liability for the tying arrangement, the 
Supreme Court did not require that “the market for the tied product 
[actually] be monopolized,” but, rather, that the monopolist’s conduct 
had merely foreclosed a “‘substantial’ amount of competition.”84 Thus, 
the court concluded that “the use of monopoly power attained in one 
market to gain a competitive advantage in another [was] a violation of 
[Section] 2, even if [the alleged monopolist did not] attempt to 
monopolize the second market.”85 
Berkey Photo, one of the “largest and most significant antitrust 
suits” of its time,86 stands for the proposition that a monopolist is 
liable under § 2 of the Sherman Act on a theory of monopoly 
leveraging if it used “its monopoly power in one market to gain a 
competitive advantage in another, albeit without an attempt to 
                                                 
80 Id. 
81 Id. (quoting United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S.100 , at 108 (1948)). 
82 Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 275 (quoting Griffith, 334 U.S. at 107). 
83 Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 275. 
84 Id. at 276 (quoting Times Picayune Publ’g Co. v. United States, 354 U.S. 
594, 608-09 (1953). 
85 Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 276. 
86 Id. at 267. 
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monopolize the second market.”87 The court’s holding is most notable 
in that it does not require that the monopolist utilize its monopoly in 
one market in an attempt to monopolize a secondary market; it only 
requires an attempt to gain a “competitive advantage” in the secondary 
market. While not specifically addressing intellectual property, it 
stresses that even those who acquire monopoly power through 
legitimate means—such as a patent—may be liable for leveraging that 
power into a secondary market. Thus, the court’s holding bears on the 
antitrust-patent tension. 
 
B. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc. 
 
More than two decades after the Berkey Photo decision, the 
Supreme Court of the United States squared off against the conflicting 
antitrust and patent laws in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical 
Services, Inc. (“Kodak I”).88  Bringing claims under both § 1 and § 2 
of the Sherman Act, the plaintiffs, independent service organizations 
(ISOs), sought recovery from Eastman Kodak (“Kodak”) for its 
policies limiting the availability to ISOs of replacement parts for its 
equipment.89 Kodak manufactures and sells high volume photocopiers 
and micrographic equipment.90 Additionally, Kodak sells annual or 
multi-year service contracts to its customers for the sale and 
installment of replacement parts for its equipment.91 However, as 
Kodak’s parts are not interchangeable with other manufacturers’ 
products, Kodak does not compete with the other manufacturers in the 
service market; Kodak competes only with ISOs.92 In the early 1980s, 
the ISOs would purchase some parts on a limited basis from Kodak, 
                                                 
87 Id. at 275. 
88 504 U.S. 451 (1992). 
89 Id.. at 455. 
90 Id. at 456. 
91 Id. at 457. 
92 Id. 
19
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but most parts came directly from the original equipment 
manufacturers that produced parts that Kodak did not produce itself.93 
After some time, consumers actually came to prefer the services 
of the ISOs and Kodak suffered a loss in service business.94 In 
response, Kodak stopped selling its photocopier parts to ISOs and 
shortly thereafter adopted the same policy for its micrographic parts.95 
Kodak also allegedly entered into contractual agreements with its 
original equipment manufacturers to prevent them from selling parts to 
ISOs.96 These policies made it more difficult for ISOs to sell service 
for Kodak machines, and many were forced out of business, while 
others lost substantial revenue.97 Under a theory of monopoly 
leveraging, the ISOs claimed that Kodak violated § 2 of the Act by 
using its monopoly over Kodak photocopier and micrographic parts to 
attempt to create and actually create a second monopoly over the 
service markets.98 
With respect to the first element of the § 2 claim, the Court easily 
concluded that Kodak held monopoly power in the service and parts 
markets.99 Because there were no readily available substitutes for 
Kodak’s parts and service, it had the power to control prices or exclude 
competition and, thus, had monopoly power.100 In evaluating whether 
the ISOs had satisfied the second element of the § 2 claim, the Court 
analyzed whether Kodak’s policies were impermissibly based on a 
scheme of willful acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power.101 
The Court concluded that Kodak took exclusionary action to maintain 
                                                 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 458. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 459. 
99 Id. at 481. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 482-83; see also Michael H. Kauffman, Image Technical Servs., Inc. 
v. Eastman Kodak Co.: Taking One Step Forward and Two Steps Back in 
Reconciling Intellectual Property Rights and Antitrust Liability, 34 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 471, 484 (1999). 
20
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its parts monopoly in an attempt to strengthen its monopoly share of 
the service market.102 Finding this conduct to be anticompetitive, the 
Court held that “[l]iability turn[ed] on whether ‘valid business reasons’ 
[could] explain Kodak’s actions.”103 According to the Court, while “a 
firm can refuse to deal with its competitors, . . . such a right is not 
absolute.” 104 If a firm’s actions are exclusionary under the Sherman 
Act, to avoid liability, it must have “legitimate competitive reasons” 
for conducting itself in such a manner.105 
In one of the most notable passages in the opinion,106 at least as it 
refers to the antitrust-IP conflict, the Court stated that “power gained 
though some natural and legal advantage such as a patent, copyright, 
or business acumen can give rise to liability if ‘a seller exploits his 
dominant position in one market to expand his empire into the 
next.’”107 Because it is found in the Court’s analysis of the ISO’s § 1 
tying claim, the applicability of this language to the actions of a patent 
holder in the context of a § 2 violation is heavily disputed and has had 
various implications in lower court decisions.108 At the very least, this 
                                                 
102 Kodak I, 504 U.S. at 483. 
103 Id. (quoting Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 605). 
104 Kodak I, 504 U.S. at 483 n.32 (citing Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 602-05). 
105 Kodak I, 504 U.S. at 483 n.32. Kodak contended that its actions were 
justified because it was: (1) maintaining its commitment to provide quality service; 
(2) controlling inventory costs; and (3) preventing ISOs from free-riding on its 
capital investment in equipment, parts and service. Id. at 483. As this case was on 
appeal from the Ninth Circuit’s denial of summary judgment, the Court did not 
decide on the merits whether these were valid business justifications. The Court 
merely held that Kodak’s asserted business justifications were insufficient to prove 
that Kodak is “entitled to a judgment as a matter of law” on the § 2 claim. Id. at 485-
86 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)). 
106 Curiously, the most frequently discussed passage in the Kodak I opinion is 
actually found in a footnote. 
107 Kodak I, 504 U.S. at 479 n.29 (quoting Times-Picayune Publ’g Co. v. 
United States, 345 U.S. 594, 611 (1953)). 
108 Many attack applying this language to a § 2 violation because of the fact 
that it was placed in the Court’s discussion of Kodak’s alleged § 1 violation. 
Additionally, others take note that Kodak did not actually seem to present its patents 
in defense of the antitrust claims. 
21
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passage can be interpreted to support the antitrust theory of monopoly 
leveraging.109 While, on the whole, there is little discussion of Kodak’s 
intellectual property rights, some read the Court’s holding as further 
standing for the proposition that patent rights do not immunize a patent 
holder from antitrust violations based on monopoly leveraging, and 
that a patent holder may be liable under the monopoly leveraging 
theory for using its monopoly over a patented product to affect a 
secondary market.110  
 
C. Data General Corp. v. Grumman Systems 
 
The First Circuit was the first circuit court to interpret the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Kodak I as it related to a § 2 
monopolization claim. In Data General Corp. v. Grumman111 the 
plaintiff, designed and manufactured computers and also offered a line 
of products and services for the maintenance and repair of its 
computers.112 From 1976 until sometime in the mid-1980’s, Data 
General affirmatively encouraged competition in the service market 
for its computers,113 by providing access to several necessary service 
tools to “third party maintainers” (“TPMs”), including Grumman.114 
                                                 
109 “Even assuming . . . that all manufacturers possess some inherent market 
power in the parts market, it is not clear why that should immunize them from the 
antitrust laws in another market.” Kodak I, 504 U.S. at 479 n.29. 
110 See id. 
111 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994). 
112 Data General, 36 F.3d at 1152. 
113 Id. at 1154. 
114 Id. For example: 
[Data General (DG)] sold or licensed diagnostics directly to TPMs, 
and allowed TPMs to use diagnostics sold or licensed to DG 
equipment owners. DG did not restrict access by TPMs to spare 
parts manufactured by DG or other manufacturers. DG allowed (or 
at least tolerated) requests by TPMs for DG's repair depot to fix 
malfunctioning circuit boards, the heart of a computer's central 
processing unit ("CPU"). DG sold at least some schematics and 
other documentation to TPMs. DG also sold TPMs engineering 
change order kits. And finally, DG training classes were open to 
22
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One of these service tools included the MV/Advanced Diagnostic 
Executive System ("ADEX"), a sophisticated computer program 
developed by Data General to diagnose problems in its MV 
computers.115 In the mid-1980’s, Data General, in an attempt to 
maximize revenues from its service business, began to refuse to 
provide many service tools, including the ADEX software, directly to 
TPMs.116 However, Grumman found various ways to “skirt” Data 
General’s ADEX restrictions.117 
In 1988, Data General filed suit against Grumman in the United 
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts claiming that 
Grumman had infringed its ADEX copyrights.118 Grumman asserted 
that Data General’s actions constituted an illegal tying under § 1 and 
monopolization under § 2 of the Sherman Act.119 In response to Data 
General’s motions for partial summary judgment, the district court 
rejected Grumman’s affirmative defenses and counterclaims.120 
Grumman appealed. 
Most relevant to this Comment is Grumman’s claim under § 2 of 
the Sherman Act that Data General willfully maintained its monopoly 
in the aftermarket for service of Data General’s computers.121 
Grumman asserted that Data General’s unilateral refusal to license 
                                                                                                                   
TPM field engineers. Grumman suggests that DG's liberal policies 
were beneficial to DG because increased capacity (and perhaps 
competition) in the service aftermarket would be a selling point for 
DG equipment. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 1155. Data General also claimed that Grumman had misappropriated 
trade secrets embodied in the APEX software. Id. A jury agreed, awarding DG 
$27,417,000 in damages (excluding prejudgment interest and attorney's fees). Id. 
119 Grumman counterclaimed and asserted affirmative defenses that Data 
General “could not maintain its infringement action because [Data General] had used 
its ADEX copyrights to violate §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.” Id. at 
1156.  This Comment will only discuss the First Circuit’s response to the § 2 
counterclaim. 
120 Id. at 1155. 
121 Id. at 1181. 
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ADEX and other service tools to TPMs constituted exclusionary 
conduct within the meaning of § 2.122 The First Circuit set out to 
determine “whether a unilateral refusal to license a copyrighted work 
might ever deserve to be condemned as exclusionary.”123 
From the start, the court rested its analysis on whether or not the 
actions of Data General actually harmed the competitive process, as 
opposed to simply harming competitors.124 The court noted that 
conduct which “obstructs the achievement of competition’s basic 
goals—lower prices, better products, and more efficient production 
methods” harms the competitive process.125 “In contrast, exclusionary 
conduct does not include behavior which poses no unreasonable threat 
to consumer welfare but is merely a manifestation of healthy 
competition, an absence of competition, or a natural monopoly.”126 
Thus, said the court, if a monopolist’s refusal to deal harms the 
competitive process, it “may constitute prima facie evidence of 
exclusionary conduct in the context of a § 2 claim.”127 
Drawing on the Supreme Court’s decision in Kodak II, the court 
stated that a monopolist may rebut the presumption of exclusionary 
conduct by establishing a valid business justification for its conduct.128 
Keeping in line with the underlying principles of the antitrust laws, the 
court noted that valid business justifications include those that relate 
                                                 
122 Id. at 1182. 
123 Id. While Data General discusses the reach of antitrust liability in light of 
the copyright laws, the First Circuit’s holding is also applicable to the antitrust-
patent intersection.  
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. (citing Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 570-71). 
127 Data General, 36 F.3d at 1183. 
128 Id. (citing Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc. (“Kodak I”), 504 U.S. 
451, 483 n.32 (1992) (suggesting that a monopolist may rebut an inference of 
exclusionary conduct by establishing “legitimate competitive reasons for the 
refusal”); citing Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 
608 (1985) (suggesting that sufficient evidence of harm to consumers and 
competitors triggers further inquiry as to whether the monopolist has “persuade[d] 
the jury that its [harmful] conduct was justified by [a] normal business purpose”)). 
24
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directly or indirectly to the enhancement of consumer welfare, such as 
pursuing efficiency and quality control.129 Again, the court’s overall 
analysis turned on the overall effect on the competitive process: 
evidence of harm to the competitive process raised a presumption that 
a monopolist’s unilateral refusal to deal was exclusionary, and 
evidence of countervailing benefits to the competitive process, in the 
form of a valid business justification, was necessary to rebut that 
presumption.130 
Notably, the court refused to adopt Data General’s proposal that a 
unilateral refusal to license a copyright can never constitute 
exclusionary conduct.131 According to the court, such an irrebuttable 
presumption would be tantamount to conceding that unilateral refusals 
to license a copyright always have a net positive effect on the 
competitive process, or that as a policy preference, intellectual 
property rights should categorically take precedence over the antitrust 
laws.132 Furthermore, while noting that the Sherman Act does not 
explicitly exempt asserting one’s intellectual property rights from 
antitrust scrutiny, the court warned that the Supreme Court disfavors 
creating implied exceptions to the antitrust laws.133 However, the court 
noted that, remarkably, in the patent context, many courts have either 
treated the patent laws as creating an implied limited exception to the 
antitrust laws, or have specifically held that the unilateral refusal to 
license a patent is exempt from antitrust liability.134  
According to the court, this “patent exception” came into 
existence for two reasons. First, as a policy presumption, it was 
                                                 
129 Data General, 36 F.3d at 1183. The court contrasted that the desire of a 
monopolist to maintain a monopoly market share or thwart the entry of competitors 
would not be a valid business justification. Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 1184. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 1185 (citing Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 
U.S. 409, 421 (1986) (“[E]xceptions from the antitrust laws are strictly construed 
and strongly disfavored.”)). 
134 Data General, 36 F.3d at 1186. 
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“largely a means of resolving conflicting rights and responsibilities.135 
While somewhat circular, this presumption rested on the argument that 
because patents are essentially a government sanctioned monopoly, 
giving the patent holder the exclusive right to prevent others from 
practicing the invention, there could be no adverse effect on 
competition.136 Additionally, the court noted that the “exception” was 
“grounded in an empirical assumption that exposing patent activity to 
wider antitrust scrutiny would weaken the incentives underlying the 
patent system, thereby depriving consumers of beneficial products.”137  
Rather than fall in line with the patent exception, the court found 
it more appropriate to choose an approach which both complemented 
the underlying purposes of the Copyright Act138 and addressed the 
“realities of the market.”139 In turning to the Copyright Act, the court 
found it safe to assume that “Congress itself made an empirical 
assumption that allowing copyright holders to collect license fees and 
exclude others from using their works creates a system of incentives 
that promotes consumer welfare in the long term by encouraging 
investment in the creation of desirable artistic and functional works of 
expression.”140 Finding it inappropriate to require an antitrust 
defendant to prove the validity of this assumption in every refusal to 
deal case, the court noted, however, that the Copyright Act does not 
purport to immunize copyright holders from liability under the 
Sherman Act.141 The Copyright Act’s silence on this issue “is 
particularly acute in cases where a monopolist harms consumers in the 
monopolized market by refusing to license a copyrighted work to 
competitors.”142 
                                                 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. at 1187. 
139 Id. at 1184. 
140 Id. at 1186-87. 
141 Id. at 1187. 
142 Id. The court does note that Congress has not been silent on the relationship 
between antitrust and the patent laws. In 1988, Congress amended the patent laws to 
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In resolving the conflict, the court recognized the importance of 
“preserving the economic incentives fueled by the Copyright Act,”143 
but also sought a resolution which would uphold the policies 
embodied in both the Copyright and Sherman Acts—“to improve the 
welfare of consumers in our free market system.”144 Ultimately, the 
court held that “the desire of an author to be the exclusive user of its 
original work is a presumptively legitimate business justification for 
the author’s refusal to license to competitors.”145 Additionally, the 
court made it clear that this is a rebuttable presumption, “for there may 
be rare cases in which imposing antitrust liability is unlikely to 
frustrate the objectives of the Copyright Act.”146 The court suggests 
three arguments that may be successful in rebutting the presumption of 
a valid business justification: (1) the monopolist “refuses to cooperate 
with a competitor in circumstances where some cooperation is 
indispensable to effective competition;”147 (2) the copyright was 
acquired in an unlawful manner;148 or (3) the monopolist knowingly 
developed its “proprietary position” to maintain a monopoly in a 
secondary market.149  
The First Circuit’s holding is important in that it refuses to fall in 
line with the theory that intellectual property rights holders are exempt 
from antitrust liability. Instead, the court continually refers back to the 
                                                                                                                   
provide that “[n]o patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement . . . of a 
patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the 
patent right by reason of [the patent owner’s] refus[al] to license or use any rights to 
the patent.” 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (1988). The court correctly notes that § 271(d) 
prevents an accused infringer from bringing a patent misuse defense when the patent 
owner has unilaterally refused a license, but its contention that § 271(d) “may even 
herald the prohibition of all antitrust claims and counterclaims premised on a refusal 
to license a patent” is not so well grounded. I will discuss this in further detail below. 
143 Data General, 36 F.3d at 1187. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. at 1182. 
146 Id. at 1187 n.64. 
147 Id. at 1188 (quoting Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. W. Union Telegraph 
Co., 797 F.2d 370, 379 (7th Cir. 1986)). 
148 Data General, 36 F.3d at 1188. 
149 Id. 
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heart of the antitrust laws—consumer protection—and recognizes that 
some actions of an IPR holder may harm competition beyond what we 
are willing to justify as a necessary incentive to innovate. Additionally, 
the court follows the lead of the Supreme Court by allowing alleged 
monopolists to justify their exclusionary conduct by presenting valid 
business reasons for such conduct. Furthermore, the First Circuit took 
painstaking care to address and reconcile the interests of both the 
patent and antitrust laws. Recognizing their common goal, the court 
presented approach that gave deference to the choice of the intellectual 
property right holder to exercise its statutory right to exclude, but also 
protected the considerations of the antitrust laws by allowing the 
antitrust plaintiff to rebut that such a choice has a valid business 
justification. 
 
D. Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. 
 
In Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., (“Kodak 
II”)150 plaintiffs, a group of independent service organizations (ISOs) 
brought claims under §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act after Kodak 
refused to sell replacement parts, many of which were patented, to the 
ISOs, who serviced and repaired Kodak photocopier equipment along 
with Kodak itself.151 With respect to the § 2 claim, the ISOs proceeded 
on a theory of monopoly leveraging that Kodak used its monopoly in 
the parts market, to monopolize or attempt to monopolize the sale of 
service for its machines.152 On remand from the Supreme Court, the 
case proceeded to trial in the district court and a unanimous jury 
awarded $71.8 million in damages to the ISOs on their § 2 
monopolization claim.153  
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit discussed the subject of a § 2 monopoly leveraging claim.154 
                                                 
150 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997). 
151 Kodak II, 125 F.3d at 1200-01. 
152 Id. at 1201. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. at 1214. 
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Interpreting the Supreme Court’s holding in Kodak I as generally 
endorsing the antitrust theory of monopoly leveraging,155 the court in 
Kodak II required that, in order to succeed on a theory of monopoly 
leveraging, the antitrust defendant must have used its monopoly in one 
market to monopolize or attempt to monopolize the downstream 
market. 156 Notably, the court reiterated its rejection of the Second 
Circuit’s Berkey Photo standard which only attached liability to the 
use of monopoly power “to gain a competitive advantage” in a 
downstream market as too “loose.”157 
While recognizing that monopoly leveraging could be an available 
theory of liability, the court grappled with the issue of what conduct 
displayed by a patent holder, could be considered anticompetitive. The 
court reiterated that the second element of a § 2 monopoly claim—the 
conduct element—requires that the alleged monopolist exhibit some 
exclusionary conduct, and not merely competition on the merits.158 As 
a general rule, the court considered exclusionary conduct to include 
any conduct that “unnecessarily excludes or handicaps competitors in 
order to maintain a monopoly” or conduct that “extends natural 
                                                 
155 Id. at 1208. 
156 Id. at 1209. In Kodak II, Kodak was attacking the district court’s monopoly 
conduct jury instructions, specifically Instruction No. 29, which stated in relevant 
part: 
[A] company with monopoly power in a relevant market has no 
general duty to cooperate with its business rivals and may refuse to 
deal with them or with their customers if valid business reasons 
exist for such refusal. It is unlawful, however, for a monopolist to 
engage in conduct, including refusals to deal, that unnecessarily 
excludes or handicaps competitors in order to maintain a 
monopoly. 
Id. at 1208-09. The court declared that “§ 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits a 
monopolist from refusing to deal in order to create or maintain a monopoly absent a 
legitimate business justification.” Id. at 1209. 
157 Id. at 1209 (citing Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 
536, 546. (9th Cir. 1991)). 
158 “‘Willful acquisition’ or ‘maintenance of monopoly power’ involves 
‘exclusionary conduct,’ not power gained ‘from growth or development as a 
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.’” Kodak 
II, 125 F.3d at 1208 (quoting Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 570-71). 
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monopolies into separate markets.”159 Drawing on the Supreme 
Court’s notorious footnote 29 in Kodak I, the court held that a patent 
holder may be liable under the monopoly leveraging theory by 
“exploit[ing] [its] dominant position to enhance a monopoly in another 
market.”160 However, as the court notes, Kodak I did not specifically 
address whether a unilateral refusal to deal in a patented product was 
exclusionary conduct.161 In fact, no other court had imposed antitrust 
liability for a unilateral refusal to sell or license a patent and most 
courts did not view such conduct as exclusionary.162 But the court 
reiterated that patent rights do not immunize a patent holder from 
antitrust liability.163 Patent holders do not have the right to exclude 
others from the market if the patent was unlawfully acquired, nor can 
they “attempt to extend a lawful monopoly beyond the grant of a 
patent.”164  
Contrary to Kodak’s assertions, the court did not turn a blind eye 
to the serious impact its decision could potentially have on the value of 
intellectual property rights. The court recognized that making the 
actions of a patent holder susceptible to antitrust violations could deter 
would-be inventors from taking part in the development of new 
technologies.165 This risk strikes to the core of “the fundamental and 
complimentary purposes of both the intellectual property and antitrust 
                                                 
159 Kodak II, 125, F.3d at 1208, 1216.  
160 Id. at 1216. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. at 1215-16. 
164 Id. at 1216. 
165 Id. at 1218. The court reasoned that: 
Particularly where treble damages are possible, such claims [based 
on unilateral refusals to deal] will detract from the advantages 
lawfully granted to the holders of patents or copyrights by 
subjecting them to the cost and risk of lawsuits based upon the 
effect, on an arguably separate market, of their refusal to sell or 
license. The cost of such suits will reduce a patent holder’s 
‘incentive . . . to risk the often enormous costs in terms of time, 
research, and development.” 
Id. (quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974)). 
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laws, which aim to ‘encourag[e] innovation, industry and 
competition.’”166 While ultimately deciding to extend liability for 
unilateral refusals to deal in patented products, the court felt that its 
approach must “account for the procompetitive effects and statutory 
rights extended by the intellectual property rights.”167 
Relying on Kodak I and Aspen Skiing, the court held that §2 of the 
Sherman Act “prohibits a monopolist from refusing to deal in order to 
create or maintain a monopoly absent a legitimate business 
justification.”168 Thus, “[w]hen a legitimate business justification 
supports a monopolist’s exclusionary conduct, that conduct does not 
violate §2 of the Sherman Act.”169 Citing to Data General, the court 
noted that this presumption could be rebutted by presenting evidence 
that the alleged monopolist had unlawfully acquired the intellectual 
property rights in question.170 Additionally, “[a] plaintiff may rebut an 
asserted business justification by demonstrating either that the 
justification does not legitimately promote competition or that the 
justification is pretextual.”171 Following the lead of the First Circuit in 
Data General, the court held that a patentee’s desire to exclude others 
from its patented technology is a presumptively valid business 
justification.172 According to the court, such a presumption would help 
                                                 
166 Kodak II, 125 F.3d at 1218 (quoting Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of 
America, Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). 
167 Kodak II, 125, F.3d at 1218. 
168 Id. at 1209 (emphasis added); see also Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. 
Eastman Kodak Co. (“Kodak I”), 594 U.S. 451, 483 n.32 (1992) (“It is true that as a 
general matter a firm can refuse to deal with its competitors. But such a right is not 
absolute; it exists only if there are legitimate competitive reasons for the refusal.”). 
169 Kodak II, 125 F.3d at 1212. 
170 Id. at 1219 (citing Data General v. Grumman, 36 F.3d 1147, 1188 (1st Cir. 
1994)). 
171 Id. at 1212 (citing Kodak I, 504 U.S. at 483). Pretext is defined as “[a] false 
or weak reason or motive advanced to hide the actual or strong reason or motive.” 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). 
172 Kodak II, 125 F.3d at 1218. 
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the fact finder in equally applying the principles of both the antitrust 
and patent laws.173 
 
E. In re Independent Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation 
 
In In re Independent Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation 
(“Xerox”), 174 the Federal Circuit was presented with facts strikingly 
similar to those presented to the Ninth Circuit in Kodak II. Xerox 
manufactured, sold, and serviced high-volume copiers.175 After Xerox 
implemented a policy of not selling replacement parts and other 
copyrighted materials to ISOs unless they were also end-users of the 
copiers, ISO competitors in the photocopier service market sued Xerox 
for antitrust violations under the Sherman Act.176 The plaintiffs 
claimed that Xerox used its monopoly over patented parts unique to its 
photocopiers to effectively eliminate ISOs from the service 
aftermarket.177 
Turning to the antitrust-IP conflict, it was clear from the start that 
the Federal Circuit was biased towards intellectual property rights. 
While tipping its hat to the mantra that the proprietary right of a patent 
does not insulate its holder from antitrust liability178 and recognizing 
that a patentee’s right to exclude is not boundless,179 the court made it 
clear that “the antitrust laws do not negate the patentee’s right to 
exclude others from patent property.”180 Ultimately, the court held that 
a patent holder is only subject to liability under the Sherman Act in 
                                                 
173 Id. at 1218 (“The presumption should act to focus the factfinder on the 
primary interest of both intellectual property and antitrust laws: public interest.”). 
174 In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig. (“Xerox”), 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 
2000). 
175 Xerox, 203 F.3d at 1324. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. 
178 Id. at 1325 (“Intellectual property rights do not confer a privilege to violate 
the antitrust laws.”). 
179 Id. at 1326. 
180 Id. (quoting Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 
1999). 
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cases of “illegal tying, fraud in the Patent and Trademark Office, or 
sham litigation [to enforce the patent].”181 Where these circumstances 
are not present, a patent holder can enforce its right to exclude “exempt 
from the antitrust laws.”182 The court’s strong language 
overwhelmingly communicated its preference for the patent laws. 
Furthermore, the court severely limited the application of the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Kodak I by asserting that the language in 
footnote 29 stood for nothing more than the “undisputed premise that 
the patent holder cannot use his statutory right to refuse to sell 
patented parts to gain a monopoly in a market beyond the scope of the 
patent.”183 The court hung its hat on this principle and declared that so 
long as the patentee operates within the scope of the statutory patent 
grant, it has the unqualified right to refuse to sell or license its patented 
product. Kodak I did nothing to limit this freedom whatsoever.184 In 
essence, according to the Federal Circuit, a patent holder’s right to 
exclude extends to any relevant market that involves the use, 
manufacture, or sale of the invention.185 Going even further, the court 
held that a patent holder does not violate the Sherman Act by 
unilaterally refusing to license or sell a patented item, even if the 
refusal to deal impacts competition in more than one market.186 
The court also expressly rejected the rebuttable presumption 
approach taken by the Ninth Circuit in Kodak II. Akin to its disregard 
for the subjective motivation of a patentee in bringing suit to enforce 
its proprietary rights, the court held that a patent holder’s subjective 
                                                 
181 Xerox, 203 F.3d at 1327-28. Aside from illegal tying, the court also attaches 
liability in patent infringement suits where: (1) “the asserted patent was obtained 
through knowing and willful fraud;” or (2) “the infringement suit was a mere sham 
to cover what is actually no more than an attempt to interfere directly with the 
business relationships of a competitor.” Id. at 1326. 
182 Id. (emphasis added). 
183 Id. at 1327. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. at 1326-27. 
186 Id. at 1327 (“[W]e have expressly held that, absent exceptional 
circumstances, a patent may confer the right to exclude competition altogether in 
more than one antitrust market”). 
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intent in refusing to deal in the patented product are irrelevant to 
antitrust law.187 The court refused to “inquire into [a patentee’s] 
subjective motivation for exerting his statutory rights, even though his 
refusal to sell or license his patented invention may have an 
anticompetitive effect.”188 Essentially, the court’s approach entails first 
asking the threshold question of whether the patentee’s refusal to sell 
its patented product exceeds the scope of the patent grant.189 If the 
answer is no, then the court’s analysis ends and it will not inquire into 
the patent holder’s subjective intent for participating in such 
conduct.190  
 While all of the above cases do not necessarily discuss the 
antitrust-IP conflict, their holdings all have significant impact on the 
subject. The Seventh Circuit addressed many of these cases in Schor v. 
Abbott Labs, but except for a nod in the Federal Circuit’s direction, 
disagreed with or decided to disregard the holdings and reasoning of 
these cases. The presentation of Schor v. Abbott Labs and following 
discussion will shed light on why the court’s choice to do so was 
incorrect. 
 
III. SCHOR V. ABBOTT LABORATORIES  
 
A. Facts and the District Court’s Opinion 
 
Abbot Laboratories (“Abbott”) is an Illinois-based pharmaceutical 
company engaged in the business of developing, manufacturing and 
distributing a wide variety of drugs within the United States and 
worldwide.191 Among its portfolio of marketed drugs are several for 
                                                 
187 Id. 
188 Id. at 1327-28. 
189 Id. at 1328. 
190 Id. 
191 Schor v. Abbott Labs. (“Abbott I”), 378 F. Supp. 2d 850, 852 (N.D. Ill. 
2005). 
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the treatment of HIV and AIDS.192 One such drug, ritonavir, is a 
protease inhibitor (PI)193 that slows the progression of the disease by 
preventing cells that have been infected with HIV from producing new 
copies of the virus.194 Ritonavir, sold under the brand name Norvir, 
was originally marketed as a stand-alone drug, but caused severe side 
effects when used alone in high doses.195 Abbott found, however, that 
Norvir had powerful effects when used in conjunction with other 
protease inhibitors.196 By blocking an enzyme in the liver that 
normally metabolizes away PIs, Norvir causes combined PIs to last 
longer in the bloodstream, thus boosting their overall effectiveness.197 
This “boosting” effect allows HIV and AIDS patients to take lower 
doses of these other PIs, and less frequently.198 Abbott offers its own 
ritonavir boosted combination drug under the brand name Kaletra.199  
                                                 
192 HIV (human immunodeficiency virus) is a retrovirus that causes AIDS 
(acquired immune deficiency syndrome). Schor v. Abbott Labs. (“Abbott II”), 457 
F.3d 608, 609 (7th Cir. 2006). For more information on HIV/AIDS, its transmission 
and treatments, see CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, HIV/AIDS, 
http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2006). 
193 Protease inhibitors (“PIs”) are just one class of anti-HIV drugs. Others 
include nucleoside/nucleotide reverse transcriptase inhibitors (NRTIs); non-
nucleoside reverse transcriptase inhibitors (NNRTIs); entry inhibitors, which include 
fusion inhibitors; integrase inhibitors; maturation inhibitors; and cellular inhibitors. 
See Aidsmeds.com, http://www.aidsmeds.com (last visited Dec. 4, 2006) 
194 Abbott I, 378 F. Supp. at 852; see also Aidsmed.com, What are Protease 
Inhibitors (PIs)?, http://www.aidsmeds.com/PIs.htm#Question (last visited Dec. 4, 
2006). For more information on how HIV infects a T-cell and begins to create more 
viruses, and where each class of anti-HIV drugs blocks this process, see 
Aidsmeds.com, The HIV Life Cycle, 
http://www.aidsmeds.com/lessons/LifeCycleIntro.htm (last visited Dec. 4, 1006) 
195 Abbott I, 378 F. Supp. 2d at 852. 
196 At least seven other protease inhibitors not manufactured by Abbott Labs 
are now commonly boosted by Norvir: Agenerase, Crizivan, Fortovase, Invirase, 
Lexiva, Reyataz, and Viracept. Id.; see also Aidsmeds.com, Protease Inhibitors (PIs), 
http://www.aidsmeds.com/PIs.htm (last visited Dec. 4, 2006) 
197 Abbott II, 457 F.3d at 610. 
198 Id. 
199 Id. 
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Along with potentially lowering the cost of effective treatment 
and reducing the number of doses a patient must take daily, Norvir is 
also effective in combating drug resistance. Drug resistance—
reduction in the ability of a drug, or combination of drugs, to block 
HIV reproduction in the body200—is a huge problem affecting 
HIV/AIDS patients.201 In general, it is important for those suffering 
from HIV/AIDS to have a variety of effective PIs, or other drugs, 
available to them if they become resistant to a particular drug or drug 
cocktail and need to alter their treatment regimen.202 Resistance to a 
drug often occurs when the drug is not effective at preventing the virus 
from reproducing inside the body. If the virus continues to reproduce 
during treatment, it can alter itself—or "mutate"—to avoid the 
drugs.203 Norvir helps to keep viral replication and, thus, mutation to a 
minimum by keeping the concentration of the boosted protease 
inhibitor in the bloodstream high. Norvir-boosted PIs are therefore 
able to remain effective treatments for longer periods of time. 204  
Abbott holds a patent on ritonavir205 and, thus, controls 100% of 
the Norvir market.206 Abbott also holds a patent covering ritonavir 
taken in combination with other protease inhibitors.207 In 2003, 
Kaletra, Abbott’s own boosted PI, began to lose its market share and 
defendant responded by raising the price of Norvir by more than four-
                                                 
200 See Aidsmeds.com, Understanding Drug Resistance and the Tests to 
Measure It, http://www.aidsmeds.com/lessons/Resistance1.htm (last visited Dec. 4, 
2006) 
201 Abbott I, 378 F. Supp. 2d at 852. 
202 Id. 
203 See Aidsmeds.com, Understanding Drug Resistance and the Tests to 
Measure It, http://www.aidsmeds.com/lessons/Resistance1.htm (last visited Dec. 4, 
2006) 
204 Abbott I, 378 F. Supp. 2d at 852. 
205 U.S. Patent No. 6,037,157 (filed Jun. 26, 1996) (hereinafter the ‘157 
patent). 
206 Abbott I, 378 F. Supp. 2d at 852. 
207 U.S. Patent No. 5,886,036 (filed Mar. 20, 1997) (hereinafter the ‘036 
patent). 
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hundred percent.208 However, Abbott did not raise the price of 
ritonavir as incorporated in Kaletra.209 As a result, Kaletra costs 
substantially less than boosting another PI with Norvir.210 
Plaintiff Gary Schor, who purchased Norvir for his personal 
use,211 brought a class action in the District Court for the Northern 
District of Illinois against defendant Abbott, alleging violation of § 2 
of the Sherman Act.212 Specifically, Schor alleged under a theory of 
monopoly leveraging that Abbott violated §2 of the Sherman Act by 
abusing its legal monopoly over Norvir to unfairly injure competition 
in the market for Norvir-boosted PIs.213 According to Schor, Abbott’s 
“anticompetitive pricing scheme [was] designed to exclude 
competition for Kaletra,”214 which competes in the boosted PI 
market.215 However, Schor did not allege that Abbott participated in 
any of the typical exclusionary practices such as tie-in sales, a price-
squeeze, exclusive dealing and selective refusal to deal, or predatory 
pricing.216  
                                                 
208 Abbott I, 378 F. Supp. 2d at 852. 
209 Id. 
210 Id. This statement does not mean to suggest that other drug companies in 
the business of developing and manufacturing HIV/AIDS drugs actually sell a drug 
cocktail combining their protease inhibitor with Norvir in a pre-packaged, or 
chemically combined form similar to Kaletra. These practices would constitute 
infringement under Abbott’s ‘036 patent. This only means that an HIV/AIDS patient 
wishing to take a Norvir-boosted drug cocktail, he can either purchase Kaletra, or 
pay substantially more to purchase Norvir alone along with another protease 
inhibitor. 
211 Id. 
212 Id. at 851-52 (N.D. Ill. 2005). Plaintiff also brought a claim alleging 
violations of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, 815 ILCS 505/1, et seq. and a state 
law claim for unjust enrichment. Abbott I, 378 F. Supp. 2d. at 852. 
213 Id. 
214 Id. at 853. 
215 Id. at 855. 
216 Abbott II, 457 F.2d at 610. 
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Such a claim of “free-standing” monopoly leveraging had never 
been brought before the Seventh Circuit.217 More importantly, the 
Seventh Circuit had never addressed “whether the Sherman Act limits 
a patentee’s right to exclude others from more than one relevant 
market” under a theory of monopoly leveraging.218 Seeming to 
understand the weight of the case before it, the district court not only 
took note of the “sparse case law regarding if or how the monopoly 
leveraging theory applies to conduct by a [patent holder],” but also 
that the little existing case law did not relate to a price increase by the 
patent holder.219 Thus, looking for guidance, the court analogized the 
price increase at issue to refusal to deal cases with because, “if a 
patentee has the right to refuse to sell its product altogether, it has the 
right to raise the price.”220 Above all, the court reiterated that in order 
to violate the Sherman Act, the alleged monopolist’s conduct must 
harm competition in the relevant market.221 
Turning specifically to the issue of whether a patent holder may 
be liable under a theory of monopoly leveraging for unilaterally 
increasing the price of its patented product, the court addressed the 
split between the Ninth Circuit and Federal Circuits. The district court 
ultimately sided with the Federal Circuit’s “sounder” approach and 
                                                 
217 Id. at 611. Curiously, the Seventh Circuit felt it appropriate to analogize 
Abbott’s price increase conduct to the refusal to deal conduct present in Xerox and 
Kodak II when discussing relevant approaches to dealing with a monopoly 
leveraging claim, yet refrained from doing so when it characterized Schor’s 
monopoly leveraging claim as “free standing.” Wouldn’t it have been similarly 
appropriate for the court to analogize a price increase to a refusal to deal in 
determining whether Abbott participated in any of the “normal exclusionary 
practices”? 
218 Abbott I, 378 F. Supp. 2d at 857.  
219 Id. at 856. In fact, as you can see from the cases discussed above, most 
either dealt with a refusal to deal/license in the patented product or a tie-in sales. 
220 Id. (citing Zenith Labs., Inc. v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 530 F.2d 508, 513 n.9 
(3d Cir. 1976) (“[A] patentee is privileged to withhold [its invention] from sale at 
any price, or to offer it for sale at any price he wishes, low or high.”)). 
221 Abbott I, 378 F. Supp. 2d at 856 (“[A] monopoly leveraging claim 
‘presupposes anticompetitive conduct.’”) (quoting Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. 
McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993)). 
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held that, “subject to narrow limitations . . ., a patentee’s exercise of its 
statutorily-granted market power does not constitute a Sherman Act 
violation, even if such conduct affects a second market.”222 
Conversely, the court interpreted the Kodak II as limiting a patent 
holder’s right to exclude others to a single market.223 As with the 
Federal Circuit, the court felt that so long as the secondary market was 
encompassed by the patent claims, the patent holder’s right to exclude 
was not curtailed by the antitrust laws in that market.224 
The court also noted that, as distinguished from Xerox and Kodak 
II, Abbott’s patents cover Norvir’s use in the stand-alone market, as 
well as in the Norvir-boosted PI market.225 While not unsympathetic to 
the plaintiff’s concerns, the court feared it would run afoul of the aims 
of the antitrust and patent laws to encourage innovation and 
competition by imposing liability on a manufacturer that raised the 
price on patented products wholly within its patent grant.226 According 
to the court, the Federal Circuit’s approach “[kept] with the case law 
and the statutory language suggesting that a court must consider the 
scope of the patent grant when determining whether an antitrust 
violation has occurred.”227 Holding that the defendant had not 
exceeded the scope of its patents, the court granted Abbott’s motion to 
dismiss.228 Schor appealed. 
 
B. The Seventh Circuit’s Opinion 
 
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the District Court and 
held that Abbott did not violate the Sherman Act by discriminately 
raising the price of ritonavir in Norvir. The court read the district 
court’s opinion as holding that a monopoly leveraging claim cannot 
                                                 
222 Abbott I, 378 F. Supp. 2d at 858. 
223 Id. at 857. 
224 Id. 
225 Id. at 859. 
226 Id. at 858. 
227 Id. 
228 Id. at 860. 
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stand absent some additional exclusionary conduct on the part of the 
alleged monopolist.229 Noting that Schor had not alleged any of the 
typical exclusionary practices, Judge Easterbrook, writing for the 
majority, set out to determine whether such a “free standing” theory of 
monopoly leveraging, could give rise to liability under the antitrust 
laws.230 
According to the court, there could be no liability under a theory 
of monopoly leveraging unless the antitrust defendant, having a 
monopoly in the primary market, could, through some “clever 
combination of prices,” make a monopoly profit for itself by inducing 
one or more of its competitors to withdraw from the secondary 
market.231 The court seemed to embrace the idea that unless the 
alleged monopolist’s conduct produced such consequences—the 
ability to reap monopoly profits by excluding others from the 
secondary market—it was not exclusionary as required by the antitrust 
laws. Judge Easterbrook opined that Abbott’s pricing scheme could 
bring about no such harm.232 He explained that “a monopolist can take 
its monopoly profit just once” either by charging monopoly prices in 
the primary market and allowing competition in the downstream 
markets, or by reducing the price in the primary market and inducing 
customers to buy more of the good.233 But an effort to do both “makes 
[the monopolist] worse off and is self-deterring”—attempting to quash 
                                                 
229 Abbott II, 457 F.3d at 610. Curiously, the district court does not seem to say 
anything to this effect. 
230 Id. at 610-11. The court concluded that Abbott’s conduct could not be 
considered a tie-in, a refusal to deal, price discrimination, a price-squeeze, nor an 
example of predatory pricing. This conclusion is questionable, to say the least.  
231 Id. at 611. This Comment will only focus on the court’s ultimate decision 
on how to determine whether a patent holder can be subject to liability on a theory of 
monopoly leveraging. Discussion of the court’s strange reservations on the theory of 
monopoly leveraging, which has deep roots in antitrust jurisprudence, is saved for a 
later time. 
232 Id. The court believes that this practice does not harm consumers because 
the alleged monopolist could not increase its profits. Yet, why would Abbot adopt 
these practices in the first place? 
233 Id. at 611-12. 
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the competition in such a way is simply not economical.234 Thus, 
because a monopolist could not technically increase profits through 
such a discriminatory pricing scheme by making it unprofitable for 
others to compete in the market, it simply should not be prohibited by 
the antitrust laws.235 
As further support that Abbott’s conduct was not exclusionary, the 
court noted that Abbott’s competitors had not taken their drugs off the 
market and, thus, consumers were not harmed. 236 Abbott’s rivals were 
continuing to profitably sell their competing products, so there was no 
prospect that Abbott was going to monopolize the market of Norvir-
boosted PI’s.237 Unless Abbott’s unilateral conduct “create[d] a 
dangerous probability of success in monopolizing [the secondary 
market” its conduct was not unlawful under the Sherman Act.238 On 
this point, the court condemned the approach taken by the Ninth 
Circuit in Kodak II and parts of the Second Circuit’s approach in 
Berkey Photo.239 The court reasoned that “[t]he ninth circuit did not 
give any reason for thinking that a monopolist’s acquisition of market 
power in a complementary product injures consumers.”240 In the 
court’s opinion, the Kodak II standard, which conditioned success on a 
monopoly leveraging claim on a mere showing that the antitrust 
defendant had “[used] its monopoly in one market to monopolize or 
                                                 
234 Id. at 612. 
235 Id. 
236 Id. at 613. “None of Abbott’s rivals contends that, at Kaletra’s going price, 
it is unable to sell its own protease inhibitor profitably.” Id. at 610. 
237 Id. at 613. This also relates back to the court’s discussion of why monopoly 
leveraging should not be a theory of antitrust liability. According to Judge 
Easterbrook, Abbott could have either a monopoly in the Norvir market or in the 
Kaletra market, not both. But, curiously, earlier in the opinion, the court cast serious 
doubt on whether Abbott actually held a monopoly in the Norvir market. And other 
courts have suggested that it is not necessary to succeed on a theory of monopoly 
leveraging that the antitrust defendant have a monopoly in the primary market. 
238 Id. 
239 Id. 
240 Id. 
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attempt to monopolize [a] downstream market,”241 was 
“undisciplined.” Instead, the court opted to side with the Federal 
Circuit in saying that the Ninth Circuit “just got it wrong.”242  
Furthermore, the court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation 
of Kodak I as a “misunderstanding” of the Supreme Court’s holding.243 
According to Judge Easterbrook, the Ninth Circuit erroneously read 
Kodak I as forbidding firms with market power from dealing in 
complementary products.244 Interpreted correctly, Judge Easterbrook 
claimed, Kodak I stood for the proposal that firms with market power 
are forbidden to deal in complementary products only “in ways that 
take advantage of customers’ sunk costs.”245 In Kodak I, because 
Kodak initially allowed the ISOs to service its photocopiers, but then 
switched to a closed-service model, it “had the potential to raise the 
total cost of copier-plus-service above the competitive level” and 
above the price it charged if it had done its own repair work from the 
outset.246 Because such a switch that would exploit customers’ sunk 
costs was not possible, the court concluded that Schor could only be 
successful if it were to generalize Kodak I as promulgating “a rule 
against selling products that complement those in which the defendant 
has market power.”247 
                                                 
241 Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. (“Kodak II”), 125 F.3d 
1195, 1209 (9th Cir. 1997). 
242 Abbott II, 457 F.3d at 613 (citing In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig. 
(“Xerox”), 203 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). The court stated that: 
It would be possible to cabin [Kodak II] by observing that, despite 
the opinion’s language, the case arose from a refusal to deal, so it 
occupies one of the traditional antitrust categories rather than a 
claim of “naked” monopoly leveraging of the sort that Schor 
attempts to pursue. But we think it better to join the Federal Circuit 
in saying that [Kodak II] just got it wrong. 
Abbott II, 457 F.3d at 613. 
243 Id. at 614. 
244 Id. at 613-14. 
245 Id. at 614. 
246 Id. 
247 Id. 
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On the whole, the court cabined its decision on the theory that 
Abbott’s disparate pricing of ritonavir did not harm consumers. 
Abbot’s conduct did not force other competitors in the Norvir-boosted 
PIs out of the market and it was not exploiting consumers’ sunk costs. 
In fact, the court noted that consumers technically benefited from the 
relatively low price for ritonavir in Kaletra248 and, because the antitrust 
laws “condemn high prices, not low ones, . . . it would be wholly 
inappropriate to oblige Abbott to raise its price for Kaletra.”249 A 
patent holder “is entitled to charge whatever the traffic will bear” and 
is not required “to cooperate with rivals by selling them products [at 
prices] that would help the rivals to compete.”250 Even though this 
case seemingly presented perfect conditions for the court to analyze a 
patent holder’s potential liability under the antitrust laws, this was one 
of the only references that the court made to the antitrust-IP conflict. 
 
IV. WHY THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT “JUST GOT IT WRONG”  
AND HOW IT COULD HAVE DONE RIGHT  
 
A. Where the Seventh Circuit Went Wrong 
 
The Seventh Circuit’s holding in Abbott II essentially dodges the 
patent-antitrust conflict by failing to discuss, let alone attempting to 
reconcile their respective considerations. Almost no formal discussion 
is made of the elements of a § 2 monopolization claim, let alone as 
                                                 
248 The court seems to frame its arguments on the idea that Schor was 
complaining about the “relatively low” price of ritonavir in Kaletra, when in reality, 
Schor was complaining about Abbott’s 500% increase in the price of ritonavir in 
Norvir. According to Schor’s complaint, the price of Kaletra never fluctuated. Thus, 
it is the fact that Abbott drastically increased the price of Norvir—a component in 
many other combination drug treatments—that was harming consumers. 
249 Id. at 613. Again, it is not the low price of ritonavir in Kaletra that Schor 
complains of, but rather the high price of ritonavir in Norvir. Schor is arguing that 
the Abbott should be obliged to lower the price of Norvir. 
250 Id. at 610. 
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they apply to patent holders.251 Abbott II, a case that should have laid 
the groundwork for similar cases to come, leaves much to want as far 
as guiding how antitrust plaintiffs should proceed under a theory of 
monopoly leveraging against patent holder-monopolists. While 
outright rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s approach on at least one ground, 
the court does not clearly advocate for that of the Federal Circuit. Nor 
does the court present why the reasoning of the Federal Circuit is 
superior to that of the Ninth. After Abbott II, it is not entirely clear 
what conduct on the part of a patent holder is actionable, especially 
under the monopoly leveraging theory. 
Furthermore, contrary to what he stated upfront, Judge 
Easterbrook presented his opinion in terms of whether Abbott’s 
unilateral price increase was an exclusionary practice, and not in terms 
of whether a “naked” theory of monopoly leveraging could be 
successful under the Sherman Act. The court ultimately found that 
because Abbott’s conduct was not forcing other competitors from the 
market, it was not harming consumers and thus was not exclusionary 
and did not violate the antitrust laws. While determining whether an 
alleged monopolist’s conduct is exclusionary is one of the main steps 
to finding liability under the Sherman Act, the court nevertheless 
missed its chance to set out a clear standard for the potential liability 
of a patent holder under a theory of monopoly leveraging.252 The court 
seemed to just ignore one of the major issues presented to it. 
                                                 
251 While the court assumed, as the complaint was dismissed for failure to state 
a claim, that Abbott had market power, thus addressing the first element of a § 2 
monopolization claim, the court fails to clearly assess the second element—whether 
Abbott’s conduct was exclusionary or anticompetitive. Id. at 610-11. 
252 Also curious is the fact that the court spent the majority of the opinion 
attempting to show that Abbott’s conduct was not exclusionary rather than realize, as 
the district court did, that a unilateral price increase is akin to a unilateral refusal to 
deal. Refusing to sell a product is the same as selling it at an infinite price; because 
no one can afford to pay an infinite amount, it is essentially the same as refusing to 
sell the product altogether. Thus, a refusal to deal is merely a subset of a unilateral 
price increase. Additionally, the court’s conclusion that Abbott’s conduct does not 
fall into any of the mentioned traditional exclusionary practices is questionable. It is 
not such a stretch to see how Abbott’s price increase is akin to the price-squeeze 
claim in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 436-38 (2d Cir. 
44
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What’s more, the court misinterpreted not only the Ninth Circuit’s 
holding in Kodak II, but also the Supreme Court’s holding in Kodak I. 
The court interpreted the Ninth Circuit’s Kodak II decision as 
completely limiting a patent holder’s right to exclude others to a single 
market.253 This interpretation is too broad. The Ninth Circuit held that 
a patent holder may violate the Sherman Act by using its patents to 
monopolize or attempt to monopolize a secondary market.254 Aside 
from such anticompetitive conduct, the patent holder is free to use the 
patented product as it wishes, in any market. The court interpreted the 
Kodak I holding as standing for the proposition that a monopolist can’t 
deal in complementary products in a way that takes advantage of 
customers’ sunk costs.255 This interpretation is too narrow. The 
Supreme Court clearly states that under § 2 of the Sherman Act, a firm 
cannot wield its monopoly power “as part of a scheme of willful 
acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power” in a secondary 
market.256 
Overall, the few statements that the court did make concerning the 
relationship between the antitrust and patent laws tend to resolve the 
conflict in favor of the latter.257 Much like the Federal Circuit, the 
Seventh Circuit sends a message that patentees essentially have free 
reign in any of the markets encircled within its patent grants.258 
                                                                                                                   
1945), where the defendant violated the Sherman Act by selling processed aluminum 
sheets (i.e. Kaletra) for less than the price it charged for the raw aluminum required 
to make them (i.e. Norvir).  
253 Abbott II, 457 F.3d at 613-14. 
254 Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. (Kodak II), 125 F.3d 
1195, 1209 (9th Cir. 1997). 
255 Abbott II, 457 F.3d at 614. 
256 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc. (Kodak I), 504 U.S. 
451, 483 (1992). 
257 Abbott II, 457 F.3d at 614 (“It would make little sense to use the antitrust 
laws to condemn Abbott for a strategy . . . that the patents entitle Abbott to pursue if 
it chooses.”) (emphasis added); id. at 610 (“[A] patent holder is entitled to charge 
whatever the traffic will bear.”) (emphasis added). 
258 Id. at 614 (“Recall that [Abbott’s] patents cover not only ritonavir 
administered by itself but also ritonavir administered in combination with another 
45
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Additionally, the Seventh Circuit chose to take the side of the Federal 
Circuit in rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s approach. Whether or not this 
can necessarily be interpreted as a direct adoption of the Federal 
Circuit’s approach, it can be inferred that if the Seventh Circuit had 
clearly advocated for a particular approach, it would have been one 
that gave great deference to the patent laws. Yet, as it will become 
clear in the following discussion, elevating one set of laws above the 
other is improper and can have detrimental effects on competition. 
Because it best harmonizes the patent and antitrust laws, the Seventh 
Circuit should have adopted the approach taken by the First and Ninth 
Circuits.  
 
B. Harmonizing the Patent and Antitrust Laws 
 
Historically, the public has held a particular distain for 
monopolies. Like many other Americans at the time, Thomas 
Jefferson, the author of the 1793 Patent Act and an inventor himself, 
had an “instinctive aversion to monopolies,” initially including those 
given under the patent grant.259 While clearly recognizing the social 
and economic rationale of the patent system, Jefferson did not feel that 
the exclusive rights of the patent grant should be freely given. He 
insisted that in order to deserve the “embarrassment of an exclusive 
patent,” technologies must meet very high standards.260 Only 
                                                                                                                   
protease inhibitor. Abbott therefore could take control of the market in combination 
treatments until the patents expire.”) (emphasis added). 
259 Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1966) (“From France, he wrote to 
Madison (July 1788) urging a Bill of Rights provision restricting monopoly, and as 
against the argument that limited monopoly might serve to incite ‘ingenuity,’ he 
argued forcefully that ‘'the benefit even of limited monopolies is too doubtful to be 
opposed to that of their general suppression,’ V Writings of Thomas Jefferson, at 47 
(Ford ed., 1895)”). 
260 John Deere, 383 U.S. at 11. In John Deere, the Court stated: 
The grant of an exclusive right to an invention was the creation of 
society—at odds with the inherent free nature of disclosed ideas—
and was not to be freely given. Only inventions and discoveries 
which furthered human knowledge, and were new and useful, 
justified the special inducement of a limited private monopoly. 
46
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inventions and discoveries which furthered human knowledge, and 
were new and useful, outweighed the restrictive effect of the limited 
patent monopoly.261 Thus, Jefferson was very much aware of and 
concerned with the anticompetitive nature of the patent grant. 
In a day when the United States Patent and Trademark Office (the 
“PTO”) receives over 390,000 patent applications262 and grants 
upwards of 140,000 patents263 per year, it is hard to believe that every 
patent undergoes such a high level of scrutiny as Jefferson would have 
liked.264 In fact, many believe that it has almost become too easy to get 
                                                                                                                   
Jefferson did not believe in granting patents for small details, 
obvious improvements, or frivolous devices. His writings evidence 
his insistence upon a high level of patentability. 
Id. at 9. 
261 Id. at 11. 
262 USPTO ELECTRONIC INFORMATION PRODUCTS DIVISION, NUMBER OF 
UTILITY PATENT APPLICATIONS FILED IN THE UNITED STATES, BY COUNTRY OF 
ORIGIN CALENDAR YEAR 1965 TO PRESENT, 
http://www.uspto.gov/go/taf/appl_yr.pdf. The United States grants three types of 
patents: utility, design and plant. JANICE M. MUELLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
PATENT LAW 196 (2003). Utility patents, the most common type of issued U.S. 
patents, are what most people commonly think of when they think of a patent—a 
patent for an invention. Id. A design patent, in contrast, protects the “new, original 
and ornamental design for an article of manufacture,” 35 U.S.C. § 171, i.e. the 
aesthetic “look” of a particular item. A plant patent is available for those who: 
[Invent] or discover[] and asexually reproduce[] any distinct and 
new variety of plant, including cultivated sports, mutants, hybrids, 
and newly found seedlings, other than a tuber propagated plant or a 
plant found in an uncultivated state. 
35 U.S.C. § 161 (2002). The number quoted in the text is for utility patent 
applications alone filed in the U.S. in 2005. 
263 USPTO ELEC. INFO. PROD. DIV., ALL TECHNOLOGIES REPORT: JANUARY 1, 
1963 – DECEMBER 31, 2005, http://www.uspto.gov/go/oeip/taf/all_tech.pdf. 
264 “Over the last 10 years, the number of patent applications filed annually 
with USPTO has increased 91 percent from about 185,000 in 1994 to over 350,000 
in 2004.” US GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE REPORT TO CONG. COMM. ON INTELL. 
PROP., USPTO HAS MADE PROGRESS IN HIRING EXAMINERS, BUT CHALLENGES TO 
RETENTION REMAIN 1, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05720.pdf. 
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a patent.265 If this is so, then why should we place intellectual property 
rights on such a pedestal? While it is clear that we have become an 
intellectual property-based society,266 why should we give patent 
                                                 
265 “[R]ecent increases in both the complexity and volume of patent applications 
have . . . raised concerns among intellectual property organizations, patent holders, 
and others about the quality of the patents that are issued.” US GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE REPORT TO CONG. COMM. ON INTELL. PROP., USPTO HAS 
MADE PROGRESS IN HIRING EXAMINERS, BUT CHALLENGES TO RETENTION REMAIN 
1, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05720.pdf (last visited, Dec. 5, 2006). In response 
to waning standards for obviousness, which Thomas Jefferson viewed as the 
important threshold for patentability, one patent scholar noted: 
The PTO is now run like a business, and popular view is that 
PTO's incentive structure and need for funds are such that it more 
or less sells patents for the price of filing and maintenance fees. 
Even if this view were off the mark, the sheer increase in filings—
tripling in the last 20 years—must have lead to an even greater 
“move them through” mentality. In a vicious circle, lowering the 
bar increases filings, and increasing filings further lowers the bar. 
The populace has gotten wind of the situation, and the widespread 
perception now is that obtaining a patent has become too easy.  
Samson Vermont, A New Way to Determine Obviousness: Applying the Pioneer 
Doctrine to 35 U.S.C. 103(A), 29 AIPLA Q.J. 375, 392-93; see also Greg Aharonian, 
Problems with the Examination of Patent Applications, http://www.bustpatents.com 
(last visited Dec. 4, 2006). 
266 At the turn of the twentieth century, the Dow Jones Industrial Average, 
which many consider the symbol of American wealth and prosperity, was comprised 
of Amalgamated Copper, American Sugar, Tennessee Coal & Iron, U.S. Rubber, and 
U.S. Steel, among others. DOW JONES INDUSTRIAL AVERAGE HISTORY 3, 
http://djindexes.com/mdsidx/downloads/DJIA_Hist_Comp.pdf (last visited Dec. 2, 
2006) (hereinafter “Dow Jones”). As one columnist noted: “The Dow Jones 
industrial average has always been the great financial symbol of U.S. business and 
manufacturing. The Dow was American business; if the business of America was 
business, then the companies that made up the Dow Jones industrial average were 
what American business was all about.” Bob Greene, A Mouse Replaces Men of 
Steel, CHI. TRIB., May 20, 1991, at 1C; see also J. Thomas McCarthy, Intellectual 
Property—America’s Overlooked Export, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 809, 809-10 (1995) 
(discussing Greene’s observation). In 1991, the Walt Disney Corporation replaced 
U.S. Steel on the Dow Jones Index. DOW JONES, at 13. The face of American 
business had changed: 
[T]he heart of U.S. Steel was property—those huge mills spewing 
sparks, belching smoke and turning out rolled steel twenty-four 
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holders the right to violate the antitrust laws when patents are 
becoming less and less meaningful, in a substantive sense? The clear 
answer is that we should not. 
Neither the Patent Act, nor the Sherman Act speaks on how to 
resolve any conflicts between the two sets of laws. Strangely, this 
silence has led to many courts implicitly giving more weight to the 
patent laws, often exculpating patent holders from antitrust liability.267 
Yet nothing in the Patent Act says that patent holders are immune to 
antitrust liability, and the Supreme Court supports this principle. Even 
more troubling, the Supreme Court has stated that “exemptions from 
the [Sherman Act] are strictly construed and strongly disfavored.”268 
Then how is this tension to be resolved? The Supreme Court in Watt v. 
Alaska269 stated that when faced with such a conflict of laws, a court 
must attempt to resolve the conflict. Thus, the main concern of any 
court presented with the antitrust-IP conflict should be to find an 
approach that upholds the primary concern of both laws—consumer 
welfare. This is what the Seventh Circuit should have held as its 
ultimate goal. As the following discussion will show, the Federal 
Circuit completely disregarded this principle, while the First and Ninth 
Circuits succeeded in finding a common ground. 
 
                                                                                                                   
hours a day. But what is the property that is at the heart of a 
company like Disney? It is a new kind of property. We call it 
intellectual property. 
J. Thomas McCarthy, Intellectual Property—America’s Overlooked Export, 20 U. 
DAYTON L. REV. 809, 810 (1995). 
267 See, e.g., In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig. (“Xerox”), 203 F.3d 1322, 
1327 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
268 Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, 476 U.S. 409, 421 (1986); 
see also Silver v. NYSE, 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963 (“It is a cardinal principle of 
construction that repeals [of the antitrust laws] by implication are not favored.”) 
(quoting United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939)). 
269 451 U.S. 259, 267 (1981). 
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C. The Federal Circuit’s Approach Does Not Give Equal Weight to the 
Antitrust and Patent Laws 
 
In attempting to maintain the sanctity of the patent grant, the 
Federal Circuit completely disregarded the considerations of the 
antitrust laws. Read broadly, the Federal Circuit’s holding in Xerox 
stands for the proposition that (absent evidence of fraud, sham 
litigation, or illegal tying) no antitrust claim may be asserted on a 
firm’s unilateral refusal to sell or license intellectual property.270 The 
court misinterpreted Supreme Court precedent and the text of the 
Patent Act and attempted to set intellectual property holders apart from 
holders of all other forms of property. Furthermore, the court is 
implicitly founded on questionable assumptions regarding the 
incentives behind the patent grant. 
The court incorrectly interprets Supreme Court precedent as only 
holding patent holders liable under the antitrust laws for unlawfully 
extending monopoly power outside of the patent grant.271 The Federal 
Circuit hung its hat on the theory that if the patentee’s actions can be 
construed as falling within the patent grant, the antitrust inquiry 
ends.272 Essentially, the court holds that if a patent holder uses 
monopoly power in one market to have an anticompetitive effect in a 
secondary market, such conduct will not violate the antitrust laws so 
long as the patent grant can be construed to also cover the secondary 
market.273 Furthermore, the court refuses to address whether the patent 
holder, and alleged monopolist had a valid business justification for 
refusing to sell or license its patented product.274 
This theory of antitrust liability is completely at odds with recent 
Supreme Court antitrust jurisprudence. The Supreme Court in Kodak I 
expressly indicated that a patent holder could be liable for leveraging 
                                                 
270 Xerox, 203 F.3d at 1327. 
271 Id. 
272 Id. at 1328. 
273 Id. at 1327. 
274 Id. 
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its power in one market to gain a competitive advantage in another.275 
In making this declaration, the Court did not condition its application 
to the context of a §1 tying violation as suggested by the Federal 
Circuit. Furthermore, while the court is correct in noting that a patent 
holder cannot extend its monopoly beyond the bounds of the patent 
grant,276 the language used by the Supreme Court extends beyond this 
limited view. 
Furthemore, implicit in the Federal Circuit’s rejection of Kodak II 
and its refusal to assess a patent holder’s “subjective motivation for 
refusing to sell or license its patented products” lay a rejection of 
Supreme Court precedent allowing an antitrust plaintiff to rebut 
evidence of the alleged monopolist’s valid business reasons.277 
Because the Patent Act does not condition a patentee’s right to exclude 
on having a particular motive for doing so, the Federal Circuit refuses 
to apply Supreme Court precedent, even if the patentee’s actions have 
an anticompetitive effect.278 However, there is no reason to believe 
that this rule should not similarly apply to patent monopolists and the 
Supreme Court did not so restrict the rule. 
In addition, the court reads § 271(d) of the Patent Act as support 
for a finding of antitrust liability.279 However, on its face, the language 
of this section does not purport to address antitrust liability, but rather 
patent misuse.280 Patent misuse is an affirmative defense against 
                                                 
275 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc. (“Kodak I”), 504 U.S. 
451, 479 n.29 (1992). 
276 Xerox, 203 F.3d at 1327. 
277 Kodak I, 504 U.S. 483 (“[The right to refuse to deal with competitors] exists 
only if there are legitimate competitive reasons for the refusal.”) (citing Aspen 
Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 602-605 (1985)). 
278 Xerox, 203 F.3d at 1327. 
279 Id. at 1326. 
280 Section 271(d) states in relevant part: 
No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or 
contributory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or 
deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by 
reason of his having done one or more of the following: . . . (3) 
sought to enforce his patent rights against infringement or 
contributory infringement; (4) refused to license or use any rights 
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alleged patent infringement or contributory infringement that renders 
the patent unenforceable.281 A patent holder is deemed to have misused 
the patent if she attempted to extend the power of the patent grant 
beyond the boundaries defined by the patent claims.282 Moreover, as 
some scholars have pointed out, the legislative history of the 1988 
amendment of the Patent Act, which added § 271(d), “makes plain that 
it was originally conceived not as an antitrust exception for patent 
holders, but rather as an effort to address certain judicial precedents 
that Congress thought subjected intellectual property owners to 
harsher treatment than that afforded to owners of other forms of 
property.”283 
Thus, this legislative history of the Patent Act reflects a clear 
Congressional intent to treat intellectual property the same as other 
forms of property for antitrust purposes.284 Yet, the Federal Circuit 
attempts to justify this exact opposite conclusion by also pointing to 
§ 154 of the Patent Act, which grants to patentees the statutory right to 
                                                                                                                   
to the patent; or (5) conditioned the license of any rights to the 
patent or the sale of the patented product on the acquisition of a 
license to rights in another patent or purchase of a separate 
product, unless, in view of the circumstances, the patent owner has 
market power in the relevant market for the patent or patented 
product on which the license or sale is conditioned. 
35 U.S.C. 271(d) (emphasis added). 
281 See B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 
1997) (describing patent misuse doctrine as an equitable doctrine that allows patent 
infringers to show patentee’s inequitable conduct has rendered the patent 
unenforceable). 
282 See Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc. 976 F.2d 700, 708 (Fed. Cir. 1992 
(determining patent misuse by whether conduct falls within scope of patent grant). 
283 A. Douglass Melamed & Ali M. Stoeppelwerth, The CSU Case: Facts, 
Formalism and the Intersection of Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law, 10 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 407, 412 (2002). 
284 Id. (“A review of the Congressional record discussing the 1988 amendment 
and subsequent related bills reveals a consistent Congressional intent to create a 
‘level playing field’ under the antitrust laws for all forms of property—not to provide 
special treatment, or an antitrust immunity, for patent and copyright holders.”). 
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exclude.285 The court essentially concludes that the patentee’s right to 
exclude under this section is unfettered.286 This conclusion is not 
supported by recent Supreme Court case law.287 To the contrary, some 
patent scholars argue that § 154 “does no more than afford patent 
holders the same rights as those enjoyed by owners of tangible 
property under common law.”288 
Moreover, the Federal Circuit’s approach is seemingly based off 
of the categorical assumption that invention and innovation will cease 
if the protections of the patent laws are subjected to the antitrust 
laws.289 It is clear that the founders of the Patent Act intended the right 
to exclude afforded by the patent grant to promote consumer welfare 
in the long term by encouraging investment in the research and 
development of new technologies.290 Many scholars, but few courts, 
challenge this assumption.291 These scholars say that there is little to 
no empirical evidence that adding some limitations to a patentee’s 
power would actually lead to a decrease in technological advancement. 
In fact, many argue that overly broad protection of intellectual 
                                                 
285 Xerox, 203 F.3d at 1324 (“‘But it is also correct that the antitrust laws do 
not negate the patentee's right to exclude others from patent property.’”) (quoting 
Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1362 (Fed.Cir.1999)). 35 U.S.C. 
154(a)(1) states, in relevant part, that “[e]very patent shall contain a . . . grant to the 
patentee, his heirs or assigns, of the right to exclude others from making, using, 
offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States.” 
286 Xerox, 203 F.3d at 1327 (“In the absence of any indication of illegal tying, 
fraud in the Patent and Trademark Office, or sham litigation, the patent holder may 
enforce the statutory right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the 
claimed invention free from liability under the antitrust laws.”) (emphasis added). 
287 Melamed & Stoeppelwerth, supra note 276, at 411 (“[T]he Supreme Court 
has repeatedly rejected assertions of intellectual property rights as defenses to 
conduct that would otherwise be condemned under the Sherman Act.”). 
288 Melamed & Stoeppelwerth, supra note 276, at 410-11. 
289 Id. at 414. 
290 See Part IB, supra. 
291 See Melamed & Stoeppelwerth, supra note 276, at 414-16. 
53
Conway: The Monopoly Game: Has the Seventh Circuit Given Patent Holders a
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2006
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 2, Issue 1                           Fall 2006 
 
54 
property stifles innovation.292 The approach taken by the Federal 
Circuit fails to assess these economic realities by outright upholding 
the patent laws, even if the patent holder’s conduct has an 
anticompetitive effect.293  
By and large, the Federal Circuit’s Xerox decision exempts patent 
holders from antitrust liability. However, even if we think that this 
approach gives patentees too much freedom, at least other players in 
the market know the clear boundaries of what the patent holder has 
proprietary rights to and they can attempt to innovate around those 
boundaries. Notwithstanding this one benefit, the Federal Circuit’s 
holding was incorrect and should not be followed by the Seventh 
Circuit. 
 
D. The Ninth Circuit’s Approach Best Harmonize the Patent and 
Antitrust Laws 
 
Despite the Seventh Circuit’s inclination that the Ninth Circuit 
“just got it wrong,” the Kodak II holding best recognizes, and attempts 
to reconcile the opposing tugs of the antitrust and intellectual property 
laws. Overall, the Kodak II decision makes up for everything that the 
Federal Circuit’s approach lacks. By correctly applying Supreme Court 
precedent and refusing to categorically allow patent law considerations 
overtake the antitrust laws, the Ninth Circuit promulgated a sounder 
approach.  This is the approach that the Seventh Circuit should have 
adopted in Abbott II. 
On the whole, the Ninth Circuit set out to address the competing 
concerns of the patent and antitrust laws, rather than sweep them under 
the rug as the Federal Circuit did in Xerox. While generally 
recognizing that a patent holder has the right to refuse to sell or license 
a patent good, the court refused to believe that this right necessarily 
                                                 
292 Id. (“[Limitations on intellectual property rights reflect that . . . too much 
protection for intellectual property rights can retard innovation by, for example, 
inhibiting the development of improvement patents.”). 
293 In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig. (“Xerox”), 203 F.3d 1322, 1327 
(2000). 
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gave patentees free reign to violate the antitrust laws.294 The court 
correctly read the recent Kodak I decision in this light. 
At the very least, the court reads Kodak I as standing for the 
proposition that “intellectual property rights do not confer an absolute 
immunity from antitrust claims.” This principle cannot be disputed.  
But, the court was also correct in interpreting Kodak I as standing for 
the proposition that a firm, holding a legitimate monopoly in one 
market, can be held liable for using that power to enhance a monopoly 
in a second market.295 While noting that Kodak I did not address 
unilateral refusals to deal in a patented product, the court recognized 
that § 2 of the Sherman Act clearly “condemns exclusionary conduct 
that extends natural monopolies into separate markets.”296 This 
principle was also recognized by the Second Circuit in Berkey 
Photo.297 Because patented property should be treated no differently 
than real property, the Ninth Circuit was correct in extending this 
prohibition to patent holders. 
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit, in following the lead of the First 
Circuit in Data General, correctly required patent holders to present 
valid business reasons for exercising their statutory right to exclude in 
an allegedly anticompetitive manner.298 The court recognized that not 
all conduct on the part of a patent holder, which presumptively falls 
under the statutory right to exclude, “benefit[s] consumers by making 
a better product or service available—or in other ways—and instead 
has the effect of impairing competition.”299 While further recognizing 
                                                 
294 Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. (“Kodak II”), 125 F.3d 
1195, 1215 (9th Cir. 1997) 
295 Id. at 1216. (“[T]he Supreme Court in [Kodak I] refutes the argument that 
the possession by a manufacturer of ‘inherent power’ in the market for its parts 
‘should immunize [that manufacturer] from the antitrust laws in another market.”) 
(citing Kodak I, 504 U.S. at 470 n29). 
296 Kodak II, 125 F.3d at 1216. 
297 Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 275 (2d Cir. 
1979). 
298 Kodak II, 125 F.3d at 1212. 
299 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 597 
(1985). 
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that the Patent Act does not purport to limit a patentee’s exercise of its 
statutory right to exclude to any particular reasons, the Ninth Circuit 
did not believe that a patent holder should be allowed to do so for 
anticompetitive purposes; If the producer of any other form of real 
property should not be allowed to do so, then a patent holder should 
not be treated any differently.300 Thus, the court refused to promulgate 
a per se rule that a patentee cannot violate the antitrust laws by 
exercising its right to exclude.  
However, the court did recognize that the underlying purposes of 
the patent laws deserve some deference.301 Thus, as a means for 
allowing a jury to “account for the procompetitive effects and statutory 
rights extended by the intellectual property laws,” the court, like the 
First Circuit, held that a patentee’s exercise of its statutory right to 
exclude is presumptively a valid business justification.302 The court 
reiterated that this is a rebuttable presumption. Yet, unlike the First 
Circuit, the court held that an antitrust plaintiff may rebut this 
presumption of legitimacy by showing that the patent holder’s 
justification was pretextual.303 The court justified this by holding that 
“[n]either the aims of intellectual property law, nor the antitrust laws 
justify allowing a monopolist to rely upon a pretextual business 
justification to mask anticompetitive conduct.”304 
This presumption approach, gives respect to the goals of the 
patent laws, but also recognizes that a patentee should not be allowed 
to outright harm competition simply because he has a patent. The 
Federal Circuit criticized this approach and felt that it severely 
undermined the incentives lying at the heart of the patent laws. 
However, Kodak II does not stand for the proposition that a patentee 
cannot exercise its right to exclude under a patent grant to protect his 
investment.305 The Ninth Circuit simply holds that a patentee should 
                                                 
300 Kodak II, 125 F.3d at 1216-17. 
301 Id. at 1218. 
302 Id. 
303 Id. at 1212. 
304 Id. at 1219. 
305 Melamed & Stoeppelwerth, supra note 276, at 427. 
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not be able to use its legal monopoly power in an anticompetitive 
manner.306 This approach attempts to address economic realities by 
recognizing that the harm associated with a refusal to deal (shutting 
competitors out of the secondary market) was not offset by any 
efficiencies or potential benefits to consumers.307 The Ninth Circuit’s 
approach does not seek to proscribe a patentee’s exercise of its 
statutory right to exclude, but rather proscribe patentees from doing so 
for the purpose of monopolizing or attempting to monopolize a 
secondary market. 
The Ninth and First Circuits’ presumption approach allows the 
court to assess any potential anti-competitive effects of a monopolist’s 
conduct by requiring the alleged monopolist to put forth evidence of a 
business justification that advances consumer welfare, and allowing 
the antitrust plaintiff to rebut that evidence with a showing of net 
damage to the competitive process. Because this approach holds the 
concerns of both the patent and antitrust laws to be of equal 
importance, it is far superior to that of the Federal Circuit. Thus, the 
Seventh Circuit should have adopted the approach of the Ninth Circuit. 
 
                                                                                                                   
One may enjoy the fruits of her lawfully obtained property, 
including whatever monopoly profits that property enables her to 
earn, but she may not sacrifice such profits strategically, by using 
that property in ways that serve no legitimate purpose (i.e., one 
that neither benefits consumers nor promotes efficiency) in order 
to create additional market power. In other words, a firm, even a 
monopolist, can profit from its property (including its intellectual 
property) but has not legal entitlement to extend its power beyond 
the intellectual property grant or to create additional market power. 
Id. 
306 Id. at 1217. 
307 Joseph P. Bauer, Refusals to Deal with Competitors by Owners of Patents 
and Copyrights: Reflections on the Image Technical and Xerox Decisions, 55 DePaul 
L. Rev. 1211, 1215 (2006). 
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D. The Added Wrinkle of Schor v. Abbott Labs 
 
Unfortunately, Schor v. Abbott Labs was not your typical battle of 
the intellectual property and antitrust laws. From the perspective of the 
patent holder, patents covering pharmaceutical products entail many 
special considerations that your average utilitarian patent does not.308 
The threat that placing antitrust limitations on a patent holder’s right to 
exclude poses to the incentives at the heart of the patent laws is 
particularly pronounced in the pharmaceutical context.309 
A compelling argument can be made that limiting the scope of 
drug patents may severely diminish the incentives to invest in research 
and development in these markets. In the pharmaceutical field, 
research and development costs can be much greater than in other 
technical fields.310 The time and money necessary to bring a drug to 
fruition can be on the order of hundreds of millions of dollars.311 
Additionally, the number of developed drugs that acquire FDA 
approval and actually become successful on the market is low.312 Thus, 
                                                 
308 Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. R. 
1575, 1576 (2003). 
A wealth of empirical evidence demonstrates deep structural 
differences in how industries innovate. Industries vary in the speed 
and cost of research and development ("R&D"), in the ease with 
which inventions can be imitated by others, in the need for 
cumulative or interoperative innovation rather than stand-alone 
development, and in the extent to which patents cover entire 
products or merely components of products. 
Id. 
309 See id. at 1581-82.  
310 Id. at 1581. 
311 Id. 
312 Id. at 1581-82. Burk and Lemley discussed why drugs are so expensive to 
develop: 
Some of this cost is a result of the labyrinthine regulatory process 
and the detailed study that is required to sell a drug for 
consumption by humans. A major additional part of the cost stems 
from the uncertainty of the R&D efforts. Pharmaceutical 
companies may try hundreds of compounds before identifying a 
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once a pharmaceutical firm has a commercially viable drug in its 
possession, the potential harm that can be caused by an unscrupulous 
copyist is particularly great. This is not only due to the high level of 
investment that the drug company has made, but also because drugs 
are extremely easy to copy—once the chemical compound is known, it 
can be reproduced relatively inexpensively.313 Drug companies, 
therefore, are ultra-dependent on patent protection to protect their 
investments.314 
Yet, on the other hand there is this concern that the substance of 
these patents—the drugs themselves—can have vast life saving 
potential and that we should do all we can to protect the competitive 
market in these goods. According to the Centers for Disease Control 
(“CDC”), at the end of 2003, an estimated 1,039,000 to 1,185,000 
persons in the United States were living with HIV/AIDS.315 
Approximately 40,000 persons become infected with HIV each 
year.316 The CDC estimates that the average cost of lifetime treatment 
                                                                                                                   
possible drug, and they may not know for years whether they have 
chosen the right one for testing. 
Id. 
313 Id. at 1616-17. Burk and Lemley explain: 
While imitation of a drug is reasonably costly in absolute terms, a 
generic manufacturer who can prove bioequivalency can avoid the 
R&D cost entirely and can get FDA approval much more quickly 
than the original manufacturer. The ratio of inventor cost to 
imitator cost, therefore, is quite large in the absence of effective 
patent protection. As a result, it is likely that innovation would 
drop substantially in the pharmaceutical industry in the absence of 
effective patent protection. 
Id. 
314 Id. at 1616 (“Strong patent rights are necessary to encourage drug 
companies to expend large sums of money on research years before the product can 
be released to the market.”). 
315 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, A GLANCE AT THE 
HIV/AIDS EPIDEMIC 1 (2006), http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/resources/factsheets/PDF/At-
A-Glance.pdf. 
316 Id. 
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for HIV infection is $210,000.317 Furthermore, the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services recommends a standard treatment regimen 
including a protease inhibitor either alone or boosted with ritonavir.318 
There are no generic versions of Norvir and (according to Schor) no 
other drug on the market performs Norvir’s “boosting” function.319 
When it is so clear that Abbot’s Norvir has had immense effects on the 
treatment of HIV/AIDS, why should the court take such a lenient 
approach? 
In evaluating Schor’s § 2 monopolization claim, the Seventh 
Circuit should not only have taken into account, the economic realities 
of the market, as discussed above,320 but potentially should have taken 
note of the special considerations surrounding the particular goods in 
question. On the one hand, in light of the overwhelming devastation 
caused by the HIV/AIDS virus and the utility of Abbott’s Norvir in 
fighting this disease, the Seventh Circuit seems particularly out of line 
in elevating Abbott’s patent rights over antitrust concerns.  In this 
light, its not at all clear that we should let the producer of a necessary 
HIV/AIDS drug monopolize it in such an anticompetitive manner 
simply because they have intellectual property rights in that 
compound. Yet, on the other hand, when the producers of 
pharmaceutical compounds are so dependent on the patent system to 
reap the benefits of their investment, subjecting them to antitrust 
liability could have dire effects on the development of new drugs. 
While these considerations may have made Abbott II even more 
difficult to decide, the Seventh Circuit seemingly should have taken 
them into account when making its decision. 
 
                                                 
317 Centers For Disease Control And Prevention, Prevention Pays, 
http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/resources/reports/comp_hiv_prev/prev_pays.htm (last 
visited Dec. 6, 2006). 
318 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, GUIDELINES FOR THE USE OF 
ANTIRETROVIRAL AGENTS IN HIV-1 INFECTED ADULTS AND ADOLESCENTS 19, 52 
tbl.6a (2006), http://aidsinfo.nih.gov/ContentFiles/AdultandAdolescentGL.pdf. 
319 Schor v. Abbott Labs. (“Abbott I”), 378 F. Supp. 2d 850, 852 (N.D. Ill. 
2005). 
320 See Part III A-D, supra. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The Seventh Circuit missed an important opportunity in Abbott II 
to settle the law of monopoly leveraging as applied to patent holders. 
By essentially punting on this issue, the court gave no guidance for 
antitrust plaintiffs wishing to allege such a theory of antitrust liability. 
As supported by the abovementioned discussion, the Seventh Circuit 
should have adopted the approach taken by the Ninth Circuit in Kodak 
II.  The Ninth Circuit’s approach balances the considerations of the 
patent and antitrust laws by allowing the court to address the potential 
anticompetitive effects of a patent holder’s conduct. Furthermore, as 
Abbott II dealt with a patented drug, vital to the treatment of 
HIV/AIDS, the Seventh Circuit should have taken those special 
considerations into account when addressing the antitrust claim. 
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